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ABSTRACT 
Today, there is a dynamic new ‘Great Game’ in Central Asia engaging multiple players 
and institutions who compete for influence in Central Asia, such as the Russian-
dominated Collective Security Treaty Organization, the U.S.-dominated NATO 
Partnership for Peace Program, and the Sino-Russian-dominated Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization. Of all the players, China is clearly one of the most dominant.  
China’s authoritarian regime, domestic problems, and huge energy demands hold 
potential threats for the long-term stability of Central Asia. To sustain the survival of the 
regime, Central Asia is open to the risk of aggression from China, especially if it diverts 
public attention from internal matters such as corruption, separatist movements, 
pollution, and particularly the Uyghur question. Since the Central Asian Countries 
(CACs) are not strong enough to withstand a possible Chinese aggression alone, they are 
more likely to accept Chinese-run policies. This will probably change into a win-lose 
game in which China becomes the sole hegemon in control of all Central Asia.  
Turkey, as a bridge country between East and West, is in a position to balance 
China’s potential long-term aggression in Central Asia. To mitigate China’s influence, as 
a model country, Turkey should encourage the CACs to build a regional economic and 
security organization. A CACs-led institution with the mediation of Turkey would help 
resolve regional issues like water shortages and poverty, and foster long-term stability. 
More interaction with Turkey will enable CACs to perceive the benefits of democracy 
and get the support of the West, and this could prod them in the direction of democracy 
under a self-development objective without reliance on a sponsor, China.  
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
Can Turkey Balance the Influence of China in Central Asia?  
This thesis will research the long-term stability of Central Asia and the potential 
role of Turkey to act as a balance against the influence of China in Central Asia. 
Turkey’s power in Central Asia is middle tier. This means Turkey attaches special 
significance to preventive diplomacy, generates large mediation efforts in an extensive 
geography, and strives actively for the peaceful resolution of conflicts in that region. 
Apart from historical and cultural links, and taking into account the dynamics of existing 
diplomatic, economic, development, and security cooperation in Central Asia, Turkey has 
significant influence in Central Asia.1 Also, Turkey has very good potential assets to 
convert into influence in the region. For example, Ankara is dialogue partner of the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Moreover, as a North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) member and a European Union (EU) candidate country, Turkey 
acts not only as a bridge between the EU and the SCO, but also between NATO and the 
SCO. Turkey is a ‘center’ country and a democratic model state for the Central Asian 
states. On the other hand, China is a rising global power that is increasing its economic 
influence and engendering political cooperation.   
According to Cengiz Çandar and Graham Fuller, “an expansionist authoritarian 
China represents a challenge to Turkish interests in Central Asia and it is not in Turkey’s 
interest to see China become the dominant force in Central Asia.”2 Furthermore, it is 
contended that, “nowhere do Turkish and Chinese interests diverge more sharply than in 
their attempts to secure reliable sources of energy.”3  
                                                 
1 Thomas Wheeler, “Turkey’s Role and Interest in Central Asia,” Saferworld, October 2013, 12. 
2 Cengiz Çandar and Graham E. Fuller, “Grand Geopolitics for a New Turkey,” Mediterranean 
Quarterly 12, no. 1 (2001): 36. 
3 John C. K. Daly, “Sino-Turkish Relations beyond the Silk Road,” China Brief no. 4 (February 21, 
2007): 12.  
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There are political, economic, security, and energy dimensions to China’s interest 
in Central Asia. While China’s concerns in Central Asia were initially driven by disputes 
related to border security and the desire to stabilize its minority provinces—particularly 
the Muslim province of Xinjiang—Beijing’s connections with Central Asia today are 
mostly focused on issues related to energy and energy security, which directly affect 
China’s political and economic goals.4 To some extent, the change reflects the notable 
growth of China as a potential global power.5 In the new world order, there has been a 
change from geopolitics to geo-economics in the international arena.6 This change forces 
states to act in terms of geography, economy, and technology, which China promotes in 
its pursuit of sensitive policies in Central Asia. Since it is important to remain current 
with technological-based life, the distribution of energy is very important for the balance 
of the world order.  
China’s foreign policy in Central Asia focuses on procuring natural resources, 
developing economic-trade relations, building a stable environment in the region, and 
cooperating with other powers against the hegemonic supremacy of the United States. 
Beijing focuses on increasing its engagement in Central Asia and gaining a dominant 
position in the region.7 Using a non-aggressive policy, Beijing is replacing Russia as the 
region’s most influential and powerful actor. Beijing is already the largest trading partner 
of many countries in Central Asia, and its investments in the Central Asian energy 
infrastructure are substantial enough for it to be the hegemon in this region.8 China is 
attempting to strengthen relations with the five Central Asian states of Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan (all of which, except Tajikistan, 
have a majority of ethnic Turks) for its economic and security interests. In addition, 
                                                 
4 Axel Berkofsk, “China’s Strategic Involvement in Central Asia—Strategies, Results and Obstacles,” 
ISPI-Analysis, no. 122 (July 2012): 2. 
5 Zan Tao, “An Alternative Partner to the West? Turkey’s Growing Relationship with China,” Middle 
East Institute, http://www.mei.edu/content/alternative-partner-west-turkey’s-growing-relations-china. 
6 Edward N. Luttwak, “From Geopolitics to Geoeconomics: Logic of Conflict, Grammar of 
Commerce,” The Geopolitics Reader, ed. Gearóid Tuathail, Simon Dalby, and Paul Routledge (London: 
Routledge, 1998).  
7 Erkin Ekrem, Central Asian Policies of China (Cin’in Orta Asya Politikalari) (Ankara: SFN, 2011), 
8, http://yayinlar.yesevi.edu.tr/static/kitaplar/cin_ortaasya_raporu.pdf. 
8 Berkofsk, “China’s Strategic Involvement in Central Asia-Strategies,” 2. 
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significant communities of Uyghurs live in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan, and 
a small group lives in Turkey.9 Therefore, China is also very sensitive in Central Asia in 
terms of the Uyghur population.  
From a structural standpoint, history seems to have constrained the development 
of Turkish-Chinese relations in the following three ways. First, according to Deniz Ülke 
Arıbogan, the relations advanced primarily without the initiative of the United States; 
therefore, associations between Turkey and China failed to develop as effectively as they 
should have.10 Second, Turkish-Chinese relations have been constrained by factors 
ranging from the undesirable experiences of the Korean War, to the harsh mutual charges 
over the Xinjiang issue, to the rivalry in many industries (particularly the textile 
industry). Third, the redefined priorities of the Republic of Turkey were enhanced by 
Western policies. Arıbogan asserts that by encouraging Westernization policies both 
internally and as an international security instrument, and separating herself from the 
Islamic East, Turkey could neither engage in the Far East as a single body, nor 
distinguish between her interests in the Near and Far East.11 Based on Turkey’s historical 
experiences and preferences, it seems that Turkish foreign policy orientation had an 
adverse effect on Turkish-Chinese relations prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
The collapse of the Soviet Union is a significant landmark for the Central Asian 
relationship between Turkey and China. Following the Cold War, both China and Turkey 
competed in Central Asia in order to balance or reshape the region. Due to the outcome 
of the Cold War, Turkey and China were both challenged under the umbrella of Western 
allies to develop their relations with the regional countries. The growing economic 
                                                 
9 Yitzhak Shichor, Ethno-Diplomacy: The Uyghur Hitch in Sino-Turkish Relations, Policy Studies 53, 
(Honolulu: East-West Center, 2009), 34. 
10 Deniz Ülke Arıboğan, “Opening the Closed Window to the East: Turkey’s Relations with East 





11 Ibid., 403. 
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engagement and geographic position of China in Central Asia worked in favor of Beijing, 
because of the neutral and passive approach of the United States toward the region.12  
In the 1970s, the United States developed its relationship with China to 
counterbalance the power of the Soviet Union, and after the collapse of USSR the United 
States made concessions to China, which was not a very strong country at that time. 
Apart from Turkey’s emerging domestic problems, such as economic crisis and terrorism, 
Ankara did not get much support from the West for its policy in Central Asia. Since the 
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the changes in policy between the United States 
and Central Asia have prompted advances in the dynamics of the regional countries.13    
After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Turkey promised the Central Asians 
a model of a secular democracy for a Muslim majority country, which was an attractive 
concept to the secular post-Soviet governments that were just emerging. Turkey focused 
on forming ties with these new states as a Turkic community under its own leadership, a 
concept adopted by Turkish President Turgut Ozal. This cooperation not only would 
benefit Turkey economically and politically, and would serve as a bridge to the Islamic 
post-Soviet world, but would also display Ankara’s effectiveness to the West.14 This 
policy commonly met with some support; the United States supported this cooperation, 
but also assisted Turkey as a means of encouraging its efforts. Turkey provided a good 
example of a democratic country as a model for the countries in the region. The regional 
countries welcomed this approach because, unlike previous aggressive powers, it did not 
force a dominant strategy over the region. 
After economic crises and terrorism issues in Turkey during the 1990s, the 
situation changed. The role of Turkey as a model and bridge country was unsuccessful. 
Aid from Turkey to Central Asia fell short of expectations, and economic cooperation 
                                                 
12 S. Enders Wimbush, “Great Games in Central Asia,” in Asia Responds to Its Rising Powers China 
and India (Canada: NBAR, 2011–2012), 257. 
13 Elizabeth Wishnick, “Russia, China and The United States in Central Asia: Prospect for Great 
Power Competition and Cooperation in the Shadow of the Georgian Crisis,” Strategic Studies Institute, 
February 2009, 43, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB907.pdf. 
14 RAND, Fault Lines of Conflict in Central Asia and the South Caucasus: Implication for the U.S. 
Army (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2003), 201, 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/2005/RAND_MR1598.pdf. 
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remained limited. Intentions of promoting democracy and political liberalization largely 
failed, and Turkey accepted local regimes as they were.15 Having just won independence, 
they were hesitant to embrace Ankara’s role of leadership because of larger powers, such 
as China, who were courting the region.16  
Recently, relations with China improved with the growing trade and aid within 
Central Asia, as well as frequent diplomatic exchanges, and Turkey’s support of the 
creation of the Cooperation Council of Turkic-Speaking States.17 Turkey has deepened its 
economic relations with Central Asia through trade, infrastructure, energy, and 
communication.18 Since 1991, Turkey has sought a stable, independent, and prosperous 
Central Asia with free market economies and functioning democracies. Turkey is 
interested in Central Asia due to common historical, linguistic, and cultural ties.  
B. IMPORTANCE  
Since the collapse of the USSR in 1991, China has resurfaced as a major player in 
Central Asia. Beijing pursued, and still follows, a range of political, economic, and 
security objectives in the region, focusing on the recently independent states of 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. The new countries of 
Central Asia not only developed relations with China, but also viewed the PRC as a 
sponsor to help them to develop economically and moderate Moscow’s supremacy in the 
region.19  
The newly independent Central Asian countries predominantly shaped the 
dynamics of the competitive dimension in Central Asia and the “dynamics sometimes 
overlapped, intersected, converged, or collided.”20 In addition to the influence of China, 
                                                 
15 B. Balci, “Turkey Lowers Its Sights on Central Asian Reform,” World Politics Review Op-Ed 13 
(June 2013). 
16 Wheeler, “Turkey’s Role and Interest in Central Asia,” 3. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, “Turkey’s Relations with Central Asian 
Republics,” 2013, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s-relations-with-central-asian-republics.en.mfa. 
19 Stephen J. Black, Central Asia after 2014 (Carlisle, PA: United States Army War College Press, 
2013), 83–84. 
20 Wimbush, “Great Games in Central Asia,” 260. 
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Russia, and India in Central Asia as external players, the United States, the Gulf Arab 
States, and Turkey—and to a lesser degree Europe—have also played crucial roles in the 
region. The strong economic engagement and geographic position of China in Central 
Asia has worked to the favor of Beijing.21 When turned to aggression, this influence can 
provide an imbalance to the regional stability and the new world order; thus, the 
influence of China in Central Asia should remain in balance. Due to its naturally close 
ties with the Central Asian countries, Turkey, with the cooperation or support of the 
West, should balance the influence of China in Central Asia. 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
There are many studies about the influence of China in Central Asia. Since China 
is a potential global power, the United States has closely followed the development and 
influence of China around the world and in Central Asia. Despite the literature about 
China’s involvement and counter arguments for balancing its influence in Central Asia, 
there remains a gap in research about the balancing role of Turkey for the influence of 
China in the region. Turkey has natural ties with the five Central Asian countries (i.e., 
historical, cultural, ethnic, and linguistic), and has a strong relationship with the West. 
Consequently, Turkey has the potential, more than any other actor, to influence Central 
Asia by promoting a non-aggressive model state for Central Asian countries. As a 
potential rising super power, the influences of China as a potential aggressor can cause 
imbalance in Central Asia and the world. Therefore, Turkey should play a significant role 
in promoting stability in Central Asia. This analysis will attempt to close the literature 
gap by focusing on the role of Turkey as a balancing influence against China in Central 
Asia. 
The first hypothesis is that China heavily influences Central Asia, and when 
acting aggressively, this could cause imbalances in Central Asia and the international 
order. 
                                                 
21 Ibid., 257. 
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The second hypothesis is that Turkey has the potential to balance the influence of 
China in Central Asia, which would consolidate the balance between the West and East at 
the regional and global levels. 
The third hypothesis is that since Turkey has very close ties with Central Asia, 
Turkey can become a model state for the Central Asian countries. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This thesis will describe the economic and political importance of Central Asia at 
a regional and global level. After this part, the second chapter of the thesis will explain 
the importance of Central Asia for China, including an overview of the economic and 
political relations China shares with the five Central Asian countries: Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Since these states gained their 
independence after the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, this thesis will 
focus on the period between the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the current 
timeframe. The following literature sources will be used to define the influence of China 
in Central Asia. 
Ramakant Dwivedi provides a detailed account of China’s influence in his article, 
“China’s Central Asia Policy in Recent Times.” He argues that the collapse of the Soviet 
Union provided remarkable opportunities for China to use and influence the continuing 
political and economic developments in Central Asia.22 Richard Weitz also provides an 
overall perspective for the influence of China in his study China’s Military Goals, Policy, 
Doctrine,  and Capabilities in Central Asia. He explains that Beijing’s major “security 
goal is to counter separatism, terrorism, and religious extremism in Central Asia since the 
PRC policymakers fear that these three evil forces could adversely affect Beijing’s 
control over several Chinese regions seeking greater autonomy.”23 He adds that China’s 
unstable Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, a mineral-rich area constituting one-sixth 
of the PRC, is very important to the region because of the Uighur population in the 
                                                 
22 Ramakant Dwivedi, “China’s Central Asia Policy in Recent Times,” China and Eurasia Forum 
Quarterly, no. 4 (2006): 139–159. 
23 Richard Weitz, China’s Military Goals, Policy, Doctrine, and Capabilities in Central Asia, 85–87, 
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1175.pdf. 
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region. Yitzhak Shichor refers to the role of Xinjiang in the interest of China in Central 
Asia in his article China’s Central Asian Strategy and the Xinjiang Connection. He 
explains that Beijing has tried to obtain “political influence, security guarantees, 
economic benefits, and accessibility to energy resources,” with the help of the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization.24 The end of this chapter will analyze the dynamics that 
contribute to the influence of China in Central Asia. 
The third chapter of the thesis will assess the importance of Central Asia for 
Turkey in terms of its historical, cultural, linguistic, and economic concerns with the 
bilateral/multilateral relations of Turkic countries after the end of the Cold War. Thomas 
Wheeler tells about the Turkish ties with Central Asian countries (CACs) in his article 
“Turkey’s Role and Interest in Central Asia.” He summarizes Turkey’s interest and 
relationship with the five countries and the importance of the bilateral connection for the 
development of the region.25 The RAND study of Fault Lines of Conflict in Central Asia 
and the South Caucasus focuses on the analysis of why Turkey did not succeed as a 
model for the new countries in the 1990s.26 The website of the Turkish Foreign Minister 
describes Turkey’s engagement and its relationship with the CACs.27 In addition, Aram 
Karamyan, Tilak Istiaq, and Rizwan Naseer state the influence of Turkey in the region in 
their study of Turkish Growing Influence in Central Asian Countries in Post-Cold War 
Era.28 At the end of this chapter, I will show how Turkey influences and affects the 
region.  
The fourth chapter will discuss the involvement and interest of the major players 
in Central Asia, and will emphasize how these multifaceted relations affect Turkey’s 
balancing role over the influence of China in the region. S. Enders Wimbush argues that 
                                                 
24 Yitzhak Shichor, “China’s Central Asian Strategy and the Xinjiang Connection,” China and 
Eurasia Forum Quarterly 6, no. 2 (2008): 55. 
25 Wheeler, “Turkey’s Role and Interest in Central Asia,” 3. 
26 RAND, Fault Lines of Conflict in Central Asia and the South Caucasus. 
27 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, “Turkey’s Relations with Central Asian 
Republics.” 
28 Aram Karamyan, Tilak Istiaq, and Rizwan Naseer, “Turkish Growing Influence in Central Asian 
Countries in Post-Cold War Era,” Berkeley Journal of Social Sciences 2, no. 5 (May 2012).  
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China and India heavily influence Central Asia in his study of Great Games in Central 
Asia.29 Turkan Budak argues the influence of external actors in the region in her study of 
Turkey and Global Geo-economic Competition in Central Asia.30 It focuses on the other 
actors’ roles in the region, and how Turkey benefited from its alliances in Central Asia to 
balance the effect of China in the region. 
Finally, the thesis will present an image that takes into account the advantages and 
disadvantages of Turkey’s ability to balance the influence of China in Central Asia. The 
conclusion of the thesis will focus on whether Turkey will be able to balance China by 
itself, or will require assistance from the West in balancing its involvement with China 
and Central Asia.  
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
To analyze whether Turkey can balance the influence of China in Central Asia, I 
will use a comparative study analyzing the capability and capacity of Beijing and Ankara 
for influence in Central Asia after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The thesis will reveal 
the current impact and the influence of China and Turkey in Central Asia in the context 
of economy, politics, security, culture, history, and geography. Next, I will assess the 
ability of Turkey to balance the influence and contribution of external players with China 
in Central Asia. The study will also focus on additional cooperation of the West with 
Turkey, if Turkey cannot counter the involvement of China in the region by itself.  
This thesis will make use of English and Turkish sources and regional research 
study groups who have focused on Central Asian issues for many years. Because there is 
no direct study assessing the ability of Turkey to balance its influence over China in 
Central Asia, this study will use different sources that discuss the Turkish influence in the 
region, including academic journals, articles, newspaper articles, and books. 
                                                 
29 Wimbush, “Great Games in Central Asia,” 257. 
30 Turkan Budak, “Orta Asya’da Küresel Jeoekonomik Rekabet ve Türkiye” (Turkey and Global Geo-
economic Competition in Central Asia), http://www.bilgesam.org/incele/174/-orta-asya’da-kuresel-
jeoekonomik-rekabet-ve-turkiye/#.U4-Saty4lSU. 
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F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
The thesis will focus on answering whether Turkey, by itself or with the 
cooperation of West, can balance the influence of China in Central Asia. After this 
chapter, the Chapter II of the thesis will explain the importance of Central Asia for China, 
including the overview of economic and political relations of China with the five CACs: 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. It will give a 
historical background for the Chinese involvement in Central Asia after the collapse of 
Soviet Union. This section will also show the degree of influence of China in Central 
Asia with the help of Shanghai Cooperation Organization. 
Then, in Chapter III, the thesis will try to assess the importance of Central Asia 
for Turkey in terms of its historical, cultural, linguistic and economic concerns with the 
bilateral/multilateral relations of Turkic countries after the end of Cold War. In Chapter 
IV, the study will discuss the involvement and interests of the major and second-tier 
players in Central Asia and will emphasize how these multifaceted relations affect 
Turkey’s balancing role for the influence of China in the region. Finally, the thesis will 
draw a picture taking into account the advantages and disadvantages of Turkey to 
balancing the influence of China in Central Asia. The thesis will conclude by answering 
whether Turkey can balance China by itself, or whether it will require the help of the 
West to accomplish this balance. 
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II. THE INFLUENCE OF CHINA IN CENTRAL ASIA 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will demonstrate that the Chinese influence in Central Asia has the 
potential to turn into an aggression against CACs in the long run. The study will present a 
deductive big picture of China’s foreign policy and an enlarged image of Central Asia. 
Apart from its security concerns, Chinese interest in Central Asia shows more than just a 
win-win policy with CACs. As General Liu Yazhou of China’s People’s Liberation Army 
states, “Central Asia is the thickest piece of cake given to the modern Chinese by the 
heavens.”31 
The world is witnessing a significant “shift of wealth and power from the North 
Atlantic to the Asia Pacific region” with the rise of new powers at the regional and global 
level.32 In the past, the transition of superpowers indicated that the rise of a new 
superpower influences the world not only with the competition between that riser and the 
current superpowers, but also by the changes in international politics and the new world 
order. As a potential rising superpower, China is increasing its overall influence in the 
world. In the new world order, there has been a change from geopolitics to geo-
economics in the international arena.33 In addition to security, this change forces states to 
act in terms of geography, economy, and technology, which China promotes in its pursuit 
of sensitive policies in Central Asia. The distribution of energy is very important for the 
balance of the world order. As a rising global power, China is increasing its economic 
influence, looking for alternative ways to gain direct access to energy and engendering 
political cooperation. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, China tried to build and 
consolidate its ties with the CACs. Beijing’s interests in Central Asia are symbolic of and 
                                                 
31 “Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO): A Real Force for Change,” China in Central Asia, 
http://chinaincentralasia.com/2014/08/05/shanghai-cooperation-organisation-sco-a-real-force-for-change. 
32 Kenneth B. Pyle, “International Order and the Rise of Asia: History and Theory,” in Strategic Asia 
2011–12 Asia Responds To Its Rising Powers China and India (Canada: The National Bureau of Asian 
Research, 2011), 33–34. 
33 Luttwak, “From Geopolitics to Geo-economics.”  
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have important implications for its desire to be a global power. China’s clear geographic 
relationship to the CACs is shown in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1.  China’s geographic relationship with Central Asia.  
There are political, economic, security and energy dimensions to China’s interest 
in Central Asia. While China’s concerns in Central Asia were initially driven by disputes 
related to border security and the desire to maintain the stability of its minority 
provinces—particularly the Muslim-majority province of Xinjiang—Beijing’s 
connections with Central Asia today are mostly focused on issues related to energy and 
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energy security, which directly affect its economic and political influence.34 Also, as a 
rising power, China intends to secure its geographic periphery by forging mutually 
beneficial ties with its neighbors. In this context, the CACs’ democratization process has 
stumbled. The CACs have endeavored to find the best kind of regime to adopt, but thanks 
to China’s appearance in the post-Soviet region, they find themselves still in between two 
blocs of East and West. Due to the emergence of the SCO, Beijing has consolidated its 
economic influence in Central Asia by building stronger economic bilateral/multilateral 
relations with each country in the region. Since Central Asia is fragile with its regional 
common domestic problems, such as corruption and Uyghur identity, economic influence 
turns out to be a key factor affecting political relations of the region; this is compatible 
with the policy of the peaceful rise of China in Central Asia. To some extent, this 
influence reflects the notable growth of China as a potential global power.35  
Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, Beijing has generated an 
audacious initiative to develop its ties with the CACs and to expand its influence in 
Central Asia. These efforts have gained success as of 2014 because China has good 
relations with every state in Central Asia and is a constructive and essential partner in 
terms of diplomacy, economy and security.36 Today, extensive and newly built networks 
of transportation and oil and gas pipelines connect Beijing to the CACs. Between 1992 
and 2012, China’s total trade with the CACs enlarged 100-fold.37 There are big bilateral 
projects, such as the Central Asia gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to China, the Atyrau-
Alashankou oil pipeline from Kazakhstan to China, energy transport and communication 
in Uzbekistan, the building of new roads and tunnels in Tajikistan, and the enlargement 
of road networks between Kyrgyzstan and China.38 All these strengthen the ties of China 
with the CACs.  
                                                 
34 Berkofsk, “China’s Strategic Involvement in Central Asia,” 2. 
35 Zan Tao, “An Alternative Partner to the West? Turkey’s Growing Relationship with China.” Middle 
East Institute. http://www.mei.edu/content/alternative-partner-west-turkey’s-growing-relations-china. 
36 Andrew Scobell, Ely Ratner, and Michael Beckley, China’s Strategy toward South and Central 
Asia: An Empty Fortress (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2014), xi. 
37 Bernardo Mariani, “China’s Role and Interest in Central Asia,” Saferworld, October 2013, 2. 
38 Ibid. 
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Central Asia is one of the regions where China enjoys its deepest influence, and 
China has the capability and capacity to protect its regional interests via the SCO. What is 
more, the Central Asia region also established the ground for a rising market for Beijing’s 
merchandise and an alternative energy supply source. China is gaining a robust position 
of influence in Central Asia thanks to its enormous investments in the CACs: giving 
loans and completing strategic infrastructure such as pipelines, hydropower plants, 
bridges, roads, and airports.39 China also wants to change the SCO into a more security-
focused institution to sustain stability in Central Asia in case of any possible external 
aggression or terrorist expansion by organizations like Al-Qaeda.40 In this context, China 
gets the opportunity to exhibit its capabilities to external counterparts by the periodic 
military exercises practiced by the members of SCO, and through these exercises, Beijing 
underlines its ability to defend the CACs from external or internal threats. This reduces 
the influence of the West in Central Asia through China’s persuasion of SCO allies that 
they need not trust NATO and the U.S. for their protection.41 Additionally, Beijing is 
developing an alternative successful political model for the CACs, which could be 
compared to the democratic models of the West; China has proven capable of 
synchronizing its economic growth with a powerfully centralized political model of 
governance. Thereby, China combines and intertwines the political, economic, energy 
and security dimensions of influence in Central Asia to be an unmatched player. 
To analyze the influence of China in Central Asia, first this study examines 
Beijing’s overall strategy to be a superpower and the repercussions of this in Central 
Asia. Second, this study presents China’s relationships with the CACs in terms of 
bilateral/multilateral political, economic, and security ties. Finally, the thesis evaluates 
China’s influence in Central Asia. 
                                                 
39 Fabio Indeo, “The Rise of China in Central Asia,” http://temi.repubblica.it/limes-heartland/the-rise-
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40 Sarah Lain, “Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO): A Real Force for Change?” China in 
Central Asia, http://chinaincentralasia.com/2014/08/05/shanghai-cooperation-organisation-sco-a-real-force-
for-change.  




B. CHINA’S FOREIGN POLICY AS A RISING POWER AND ITS 
REPERCUSSIONS IN CENTRAL ASIA 
Chinese foreign policy mostly focuses on following strong strategies to develop 
its own economy. For nearly the last two decades, as a rising global power with an 
amazing economic growth rate, China has been the largest importer of main industrial 
elements such as coal, iron ore, copper, nickel and aluminum. It is also the second-largest 
importer of crude oil—just after the United States—and the largest global energy 
consumer since 2010.42 As of 2014, more than 85 percent of Chinese trade is transferred 
by sea, and more than 80 percent of its energy is imported via sea-lanes, which make 
China heavily dependent on the safety and security of the sea.43 Sea lanes are important 
not only for transporting Chinese-produced merchandise to consumers such as the United 
States, Middle East, Europe, and others, but also for carrying the raw materials that China 
can no longer source domestically.44  
The rising concern over the security ramifications of the bilateral dependency on 
sea-lanes has led China to seek alternative trade links. Thus, on the one hand, China has 
started to promote its naval power; on the other hand, it develops ground transportation to 
get access to energy and varies the trade routes with the intent of reviving the ancient Silk 
Road. Recently, to decrease the vulnerability of its overseas energy supply, China has 
begun increasing its energy projects in Central Asia and transport links connecting the 
Chinese inland with South and Central Asia, and on to Europe and the Indian Ocean 
Basin.45 The Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR), which has a border of 3,700 
kilometers with Central Asia, plays an important role in providing the only feasible direct 
land bridge between Beijing and the rest of southern Eurasia. This corridor encompasses 
the Karakoram Pass; it is China’s only overland way to Pakistan and to the Chinese-run 
                                                 
42 U.S Energy Information Administration, “China: Overview,” 
http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=ch. 
43 Stratfor Global Intelligence, “China’s Growing Interest in Central Asia,” 
http://www.stratfor.com/video/chinas-growing-interest-central-asia#axzz3HDte2dgY. 
44 Temuri Yakobashvili, “A Chinese Marshall Plan for Central Asia?,” CACI Analyst, 
http://cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/item/12838-a-chinese-marshall-plan-for-central-
asia?.html. 
45 Stratfor Global Intelligence, “China’s Growing Interest in Central Asia.” 
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Port of Gwadar. XUAR’s geo-economic and geo-political significance points to 
Xinjiang’s ancient legacy as a home to the legendary and modern Silk Road trading 
routes; Xinjiang connects the Uyghur people to the Turkic communities of Central Asia 
and beyond through ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious ties.46 Today, the geo-
economic importance of Xinjiang is at the core of China’s geopolitics in terms of access 
to energy and trade routes. Similarly, energy is the central interest of China in Central 
Asia. China imports more than half its total natural gas from Turkmenistan (Figure 2); it 
imports oil from Kazakhstan, and plans to import some natural gas from Uzbekistan. 
Correspondingly, Beijing is trying to convert Xinjiang into a resource base for recently 
developing provinces in the Chinese hinterland.47  
 
Figure 2.  Turkmenistan Gas Export Rates.48 
                                                 
46 Ibid. 
47 Stratfor Global Intelligence, “China’s Growing Interest in Central Asia.” 
48 Alex Gupta, “Central Asia - 5 Critical Issues,” http://www.scribd.com/doc/236701256/Central-
Asia-5-Critical-Issues. 
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To understand Beijing’s interest in Central Asia, it is essential to keep in mind the 
five principles of Chinese foreign policy declared in 1954: “respect for territorial integrity 
and sovereignty, non-aggression, non-interference in other’s [domestic] affairs, equality 
and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence.”49 The Chinese government not only 
follows the guidelines of this policy in Central Asia, but also in other regions around the 
world. Beijing enjoys portraying itself as a rising power, but is different from the United 
States or many other countries in that it seems not to seek hegemony or to impose its 
political will on other countries.50 Since the hegemony of the United States in the world 
is widely accepted, Beijing has to pursue a non-aggressive policy to increase its influence 
by not disturbing Washington. Correspondingly, China assures the CACs that its 
economic and military growth will not be a threat, but rather an advantage to its 
neighbors and allies in terms of a win-win policy.51 Since China is a rising power in need 
of vast energy resources, it only focuses on supplying its energy demands. Therefore, 
China sweetens its policy in Central Asia with investment and aid, which currently make 
the CACs feel they are sharing in a current illusion of win-win policy with China. There 
can be a win-win game in that “Beijing provides funding and Central Asia satisfies 
China’s enormous energy thirst…if [the CACs] are not prudent [however] they could find 
that they have escaped the grip of one great power, only to replace it with the dominance 
of another.”52 As of 2013, with a $9.2407 trillion economy and a population of 1.36072 
billion, China cannot engage Central Asia on equal footing with a win-win policy when 
the CACs have a total combined economy of only $338.7 billion and a population of 
66.26 million.53 It may end up as a great win for China and a minor win for Central Asia. 
Consequently, this situation can turn into a winner-loser game and be risky for the long-
                                                 
49 Mariani, “China’s Role and Interest in Central Asia,” 3. 
50 Ibid. 
51 “China GDP,” Trading Economics, http://www.tradingeconomics.com/china/gdp. 
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term stability of Central Asia in terms of their independence in using their energy 
resources and maybe a ‘resource curse.’54 
China pursues a sensitive foreign policy to sustain the stability of its regime, and 
thus aims to consolidate the support of its public with successful external progress. 
China’s foreign policy and its implications are directly interrelated with its domestic 
policy. China is reemerging as a major power in the world. Since 1978, China has 
surfaced as an economic world power by undertaking central planning, building a market 
economy, and opening its gates to the West.55 To be a superpower, China must overcome 
its main domestic problems such as corruption, unemployment, water shortage, violation 
of human rights, pollution, and separatist movements. China’s internal problems are 
important driving forces behind its desire for a peaceful rise. A peaceful rise strategy 
helps China earn extra time to deal with and postpone its internal issues. China has its 
own troubles to undertake, and it is vulnerable to criticism for these problems. Thus, 
Beijing endeavors not to involve itself or take sides in any conflict or domestic problems 
of other countries in the world. For example, since Beijing is very sensitive to domestic 
separatist movements, like those in Tibet and Xinjiang, as a permanent member of 
Security Council of United Nations, China typically does not cast its veto or negative 
vote in other bilateral/multilateral conflicts, but abstains in order not to dissatisfy any 
other country.56 On the one hand, Beijing aims to solve its own troubles by increasing its 
wealth; on the other hand, China portrays a neutral and respectful status in the 
international arena in order to gain the sympathy of other nations, thereby preparing its 
place as a superpower. To understand Beijing’s foreign policy, it is vital to be aware of 
China’s domestic problems, which influence directly the foreign policies that Beijing 
chooses. 
                                                 
54 International Relations and Security Network, “Curse or Cure – Natural Resources and the Great 
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Corruption is a very sensitive issue for China’s administration.57 After the street 
protest at Tiananmen Square in 1989, Beijing put forth a great effort to prevent top-level 
corruption. Nevertheless, local corruption is the most significant cause of the Chinese 
public’s loss of faith in their government; examples include “poorly constructed 
infrastructure projects that collapse, contamination of food due to poor industrial 
oversight, and a general lack of faith in the justice system.”58 On October 28, 2014, 
China published a document to show the importance of rule of law and also revised the 
constitution, indicating that President Xi aims to use the constitution to control the local 
authorities.59 At the same time, Beijing attaches high importance to keeping the top 
officials and military leaders free from corruption to sustain the public’s trust, for the 
good of both its regime and military. In this context, in 2014, Zhao Keshi—the head of 
the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) General Logistics Department—stated that a new 
financial arrangement will ensure that military funds are efficiently transferred into 
combat capability, and Xu Guangyu—a senior consultant at the China Arms Control and 
Disarmament Association—declared that their renewed structure will also “make military 
spending more transparent and scientific and reduce corruption in the army.”60 To be a 
superpower, China must overcome its internal issues. This will build the public’s 
confidence in its governments. To become a world superpower, “Beijing needs to keep 
doing more to create a pervasive anti-corruption culture in all levels of government, not 
just catch the big fish.”61 China tries to suppress its domestic problems by inundating its 
public with proactive external success. Being viewed as a rising global power provides 
self-esteem to the Chinese people, most of whom have not yet enjoyed the common 
benefits of modern life.  
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Since the PRC perceives its people’s social unrest to be a threat to both its identity 
and the integrity of China, the Central Asia region is open to China’s aggression because 
of the unrest of the Uyghur population, and because it distracts the focus of the Chinese 
people from their other domestic problems. Leaders usually desire to hold on to power, 
and domestic unrest sometimes threatens their position. While leaders undoubtedly have 
a number of appropriate alternatives to deal with threats, one of the most theorized and 
tried options is the manipulation of the ‘rally around the flag’ effect through the 
diversionary use of force.62 According to the Diversionary Theory of war, 
Diversionary uses of force can have a positive effect for the leader in four 
main ways. First, successful actions abroad may win support at home. This 
increased backing gives the leader a reprieve in which to revitalize their 
regime. Second, the conflict abroad and the tension it creates at home 
could justify a crackdown. If targeted correctly, the offensive may quickly 
eliminate any vociferous opposition to the regime and its leaders. Third, 
international conflict may divert the public’s attention away from the 
issues that caused the dissatisfaction. Last, conflict with another state in 
the international systems may rally support to the regime through an in-
group/out-group effect.63  
Since Central Asia is vulnerable to China’s aggression vis-à-vis the unrest of the 
Uyghur population, or perhaps as an excuse to get more direct access to energy in Central 
Asia—and keeping in mind that the CACs are not strong enough to oppose China by 
themselves—China can abuse these issues in order to hide its domestic problems while 
also gaining more access to and advantageous control over Central Asian energy 
resources. On the other hand, 
Relying in part on the ethnic conflict research and Levy’s observation that 
the diversionary literature ought to consider the suitability of real or 
imagined ethnic adversaries as targets of diversionary action … the 
embattled leader may have a domestic diversionary option.… By militarily 
targeting disliked and relatively powerless groups within his/her own 
country—such as ethnic minorities—the leader can elicit public support 
for his/her rule. Because a person’s ethnic identity may be a loyalty 
inducing force as strong as, if not stronger than, citizenship, mobilization 
                                                 




of public support through the use of ethnic, as opposed to state, symbols 
becomes a feasible alternative for the leader. This in turn allows the leader 
to portray a domestic ethnic minority, rather than a foreign entity, as the 
source of the threat that needs to be dealt with. In doing so, the leader aims 
to create an ethnically based in-group, out-group dichotomy and boost the 
level of loyalty to him/her among those who are ostensibly a part of the in-
group … policy implications of the findings that ethnic groups can fall 
victim to government attacks in times of government unpopularity.64  
Since Xinjiang is a fragile part of China in terms of ethnic identity, the XUAR is a 
probable target of separatist aggression, which will influence negatively the stability of 
Central Asia in terms of the Uyghur question.65 The strategic importance of Xinjiang 
makes China internationalize the Uyghur question, which is correlated with three 
interconnected security dimensions.66 The first one connects Beijing to the whole of 
China with an internal control, the second spreads over neighboring countries, and the 
third extends security concerns to regional and international organizations and beyond.67 
Therefore, either as an internalization or externalization diversification theory of war, 
China’s domestic problems are important for the long-term stability of Central Asia. 
C. THE ROLE OF THE XINJIANG UYGHUR AUTONOMOUS REGION IN 
CHINA’S FOREIGN POLICY 
Xinjiang region has strong ties with CACs regarding Uyghur ethnicity. Since the 
Uyghur population is a sensitive issue for China in terms of a separatist movement. 
Xinjiang region plays an important role for the influence of China in Central Asia. China 
directly relates its national security and territorial unity with the stability of Xinjiang and 
its connection with Central Asia. Thus, Xinjiang interconnects China’s domestic policy to 
its foreign policy in Central Asia. 
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The Xinjiang region is populated by almost all of China’s 56 ethnic groups, with 
the two largest population groups being about ten million Uyghurs—which amounts to 
half the total population of XUAR—and about 8.5 million Hans. The Uyghurs in XUAR 
are culturally and ethnically close to the CACs in terms of a Muslim and Turkic identity. 
Thus, China was not only interacting with the newly independent CACs, but also 
connecting directly with the Muslim world to build a good relationship. Xinjiang is of 
central importance for China in terms of geo-politics. Xinjiang is a strategic door for 
China to open to Central Asia and beyond (Figure 3).  
XUAR is of strategic significance from different standpoints. First, it 
encompasses one-sixth of China’s mainland (reaching almost the size of Iran), it is the 
country’s largest administrative region, and it shares its borders with five Muslim 
countries: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. It also borders 
Russia, Mongolia, and India. Thus, Xinjiang links China to Central Asia in terms of 
geography, geopolitics, Islam religion, Turkic culture, and Turkic ethnicity. In this 
respect, while Central Asia is an intermediate step in China’s policy for keeping a strong 
alliance with Pakistan by “building a long-term partnership with Iran, Saudi Arabia, and 
Afghanistan.”68 It is also a meeting point for China and India to embrace both 
competition and cooperation.69 Second, the XUAR is an important exit to the countries 
along the Silk Route and the Muslim countries. Third, XUAR has about 250 million 
cubic meters of timber reserves, two-fifths of the nation’s coal reserves, and is China’s 
second highest oil and highest natural gas producer.70 Moreover, it is planned to be 
Beijing’s largest oil and gas production and storage base by 2015.71 XUAR is vital for 
China in terms of energy and energy security. Energy and multilateralism persist as 
central elements in China’s global standing, though, “Beijing’s interest in Central Asia 
will still be primarily driven by domestic stability in Xinjiang, good neighborly relations 
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with local governments, and the transformation of Xinjiang and Central Asia into areas of 
transit for the conquest of new markets.”72 Therefore, Central Asia is an essential to both 
China’s domestic stability and its foreign policy vis-à-vis the Uyghur question.  
 
Figure 3.  Xinjiang Region of China.73 
D. THE PLACE OF CENTRAL ASIA IN CHINA’S GLOBAL RISE  
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States has held a nearly 
unchallenged status as the world’s only superpower. According to historical examples of 
superpower transitions, this unipolar period will unavoidably terminate as new powers 
rise and challenge the existing global order. Therefore, the United States will face the 
challenge of a rising China in the short/middle term. China’s economy has developed to 
exceptional levels since the implementation of market reforms, and some experts forecast 
that in the next 50 years Beijing could become the world’s biggest economy. China has 
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used its stunning economic growth to increase influence in the world, particularly in 
Central Asia.74  
Since the end of the Cold War, China has resurfaced as a major player in Central 
Asia. Beijing pursued, and still follows, a range of political, economic, and security 
objectives in the region, focusing on the recently independent states of Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. The new countries of Central 
Asia not only developed relations with China, but also viewed the PRC as a sponsor to 
help them to develop economically and to moderate Moscow’s supremacy in the 
region.75 The newly independent CACs predominantly shaped the dynamics of the 
competitive dimension in Central Asia and the “dynamics sometimes overlapped, 
intersected, converged, or collided.”76 In addition to the influence of China, Russia, and 
India in Central Asia as external players, the United States, the Gulf Arab States, and 
Turkey—and to a lesser degree, Europe—have also played crucial roles in the region. 
The strong economic engagement and geographic position of China in Central Asia has 
worked to the favor of Beijing in this respect.77 If ever transformed into aggression, this 
influence could provide an imbalance to the regional stability and the new world order.  
According to realists and liberal intuitionalists, China’s rise will end up either in a 
conflict with the United States—or in some kind of cooperation towards a new world 
order.78 These traditional theories are narrow and inadequate to frame China’s rise within 
the larger context of the political development and stability of rest of the world.79 There 
are also resource constraints, external effects like pollution, and big climate changes that 
have a big impact on the political, security and economic environment of the modern 
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era.80 Without inexpensive energy resources like oil, which rose fourfold in price 
between 2005 and 2006, there is only a slight possibility of overall economic growth in 
the world; reducing economic growth will generate severe competition and aggression 
between states. What is more, climate change will cause more dislocations, refugees, 
food insecurity, and health issues, leaving states with only more reasons to start conflicts; 
this line of thinking is consistent with a realistic analysis.81 Since it is the world’s largest 
energy consumer, China’s rapid rise will bring about a time of resource scarcity and 
environmental crisis sooner rather than later.82 China’s energy demand is therefore a 
potential threat in the long run for the stability of Central Asia, but a must for its global 
rise.  
E. CHINA’S POLITICAL ECONOMY IN CENTRAL ASIA 
China is a major player in Central Asia, particularly in terms of economics, 
security, energy, and politics. Of all the regions on China’s periphery, in no place has it 
been more proactive than in Central Asia since the disintegration of the Soviet Union. 
Beijing perceives Central Asia as fragile region full of internal and external sources of 
instability, and it worries that instability in Central Asia could destabilize China’s 
western periphery. China’s policy toward Central Asia focuses on procuring natural 
resources, developing economic and trade relations, building a stable environment in the 
region, and cooperating with other powers against the hegemonic supremacy of the 
United States.83 Beijing focuses on increasing its engagement in Central Asia and gaining 
a dominant position in the region. Using a non-aggressive policy, Beijing is replacing 
Russia as the region’s most influential and powerful actor. Beijing is already the largest 
trading partner for many countries in Central Asia, and its investments into the Central 
Asian energy infrastructure are substantial enough for it to already be considered a 
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hegemon in the region.84 Apart from Uzbekistan, China is the biggest trading partner of 
80 percent of Central Asian countries. Of note, however, is that China has increased its 
economic relations with Central Asia because of Russia’s unfair authoritarian market 
policies. Russia still controls a good amount of Central Asia’s energy exports; its relative 
economic weight in the region, however, is decreasing. Russia has purchased oil and gas 
at below-market rates through Soviet-era pipelines, and resells this vital energy source for 
a higher price. This type of unjust practice is what led Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to 
cooperate with China.85 
Today, there are extensive newly built networks of transportation infrastructure 
and oil and gas pipelines that connect Beijing to the CACs. Between 1992 and 2012, 
China’s total trade with the CACs grew 100-fold.86 There are massive bilateral projects 
like the Central Asia gas pipeline between Turkmenistan and China, the Atyrau-
Alashankou oil pipeline between Kazakhstan and China, new energy transport and 
communication networks in Uzbekistan, the construction of new roads and tunnels in 
Tajikistan, and the enlargement of road networks between Kyrgyzstan and China.87 
These and other projects serve to strengthen the ties between China and the CACs. What 
is more, Central Asia has also been established as a growing market for Beijing’s 
domestically-produced merchandise. 
China’s growing energy demand is a key driving force behind its increasing 
interest and involvement in Central Asia. In addition to its decreasing proportion of 
internal energy production, Beijing’s flourishing economy has increased China’s import 
of oil and natural gas. China meets the big part of these energy needs from the Persian 
Gulf and Africa, but the PRC is aware that it is vital to diversify its external energy 
suppliers. It also knows that oil transfers from the Middle East are susceptible to 
intervention from terrorism, local conflicts, and other regional instability. Thanks to its 
                                                 
84 Berkofsk, “China’s Strategic Involvement in Central Asia,” 2. 
85 Economist, “China in Central Asia: Rising China, Sinking Russia,” 
http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21586304-vast-region-chinas-economic-clout-more-match-russias-
rising-china-sinking. 
86 Mariani, “China’s Role and Interest in Central Asia,” 2. 
87 Ibid. 
 27
Energy Eastward Transportation Program, Beijing has been supporting the construction 
of oil and gas pipelines to transport Central Asian energy resources directly into China. 
As opposed to the PRC’s energy transportation by sea from Africa and the Persian Gulf, 
China can acquire energy through land-based pipelines from Central Asia and the 
Caspian region. This alternative leads China to attribute high significance to Central Asia, 
since sea-lanes are vulnerable to pirates or foreign navies.88  
The CACs are pursuing a multi-pronged approach in their energy policies. They 
are interested in not only alternative transportation options, but also in foreign exporters 
willing to construct pipeline projects that will help to diversify their supply chains, which 
have been historically very dependent upon Russia.89 A 2013 tour by Chinese President 
Xi Jinping to all the CACs ended up with strong energy contracts, including tens of 
billions of dollars’ worth of loans to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and 
Uzbekistan.90 China is supplanting Russia’s previously superior position in Central Asia. 
The International Energy Agency estimates that if the influence of Beijing in Central 
Asia continues at its current pace, China will be importing almost half of Central Asia’s 
gas by 2020.91 Seemingly, this trend could draw a happy picture as a win-win policy in 
which Beijing offers funding and the CACs try to satisfy China’s enormous energy 
demand for a fair price. Nevertheless, the CACs have to be careful not to fall into the grip 
of yet another great power, a scenario which is very possible.92 
China also wants to improve commerce with Central Asian countries to promote 
the economic development of Xinjiang, Tibet, and other provinces, the development of 
which have all remained behind China’s booming eastern cities. Though Beijing’s trade 
with Central Asia forms only a small segment of China’s total commerce, it symbolizes a 
significant part for western China because of its geographic position. Therefore, China is 
improving new rail, pipeline, and infrastructure bonds that would strengthen networks 
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between Xinjiang—abundant in coal and natural gas—Central Asia, and the rest of 
China. More than half of Xinjiang’s external trade is with Central Asian countries.93 
Chinese investment in Central Asia encourages this by developing living standards and 
stability in a region that shares a 1,750-mile border with Xinjiang. Chinese firms are 
flooding into Central Asia, building roads and pipelines, and in Tajikistan’s capital, 
Dushanbe, even the government constructions.94 Table 1 details China’s recent trade with 
the region. 
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Chinese trade volume with the CACs indicates that Beijing is replacing Russia’s 
previous superiority and dominating in Central Asia. In 2012, except for the imports 
between Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan and Russia, and the exports between Kyrgyzstan 
and Russia, China now dominates trade with all the CACs (Figures 4 and 5). 
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Figure 4.  Trade of Central Asian Countries with China and Russia in 2012, 
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Figure 5.  China’s Import Volume with CACs. 
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Central Asia has a vast supply of natural gas. Based on British Petroleum 
numbers, the natural gas reserves of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan are 
estimated to be over 700 trillion cubic feet; they are among the largest suppliers in the 
world. Turkmenistan holds the world’s fourth largest natural gas proven reserves, with 
17.5 trillion cubic meters.97 Turkmenistan is China’s leading external supplier of natural 
gas with over 21.3 billion cm in 2012, which amounts to 51.4 percent of China’s 
imports.98 This capacity is nearly three times more than the exports of Qatar to China, 
which is Beijing’s second largest natural gas supplier. The overall volume of Turkmen 
gas to China will rise to 65 billion cm by 2020.99 Turkmenistan and China also initialed a 
“Joint Declaration on Establishing a Strategic Partnership” towards increasing 
collaboration in infrastructure, telecommunications, the chemical and textile industries, 
agriculture, healthcare, high technologies, and the execution of big joint projects. China 
has established strategic partnerships with all five CACs. The ties between Beijing and 
the CACs have all grown stronger over the last two decades. Trade capacity between 
China and the CACs enlarged from $460 million in 1990 to $46 billion in 2012 (Figures 
6 and 7).100 
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Figure 6.  Export between China and CACs.101 
In the last decade, China gained an average annual increase of 30 percent in trade 
with the CACs. For example, in Kazakhstan, more than 3,000 Chinese firms have 
invested a combined total of over $20 billion, making it the third largest partner with 
China in terms of foreign investment.102 
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Figure 7.  Oil and Gas Pipelines.103 
Kazakhstan owns 45.7 trillion cubic feet of proven gas reserves, which is almost 1 
percent of the world’s total gas reserves, and Uzbekistan holds an estimated 39.7 trillion 
cubic feet of proven natural gas reserves. China is the biggest customer of Central Asian 
natural gas. Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and, predominantly, Turkmenistan are major 
suppliers of natural gas to China. The China-Central Asia Natural Gas Pipeline has three 
pipelines, which span Central Asia delivering natural gas to China and one is projected 
(Table 2, Figure 8). 
Table 2.   Turkmenistan-China Natural Gas Lines Capacity.104 
Gas Lines* Capacity/Year Construction Begins Commissioned 
Line A (T,U,K) 20 billion cm 2007 2009 
Line B (T,U,K) 10 billion cm 2009 2010 
Line C (T,U,K) 25 billion cm 2012 2014 
Line D (T,U,T,Ky) 25 billion cm 2013 2016 (projected) 
*T=Turkmenistan, U=Uzbekistan, K=Kazakhstan,  T=Tajikistan, Ky=Kyrgyzstan 
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Figure 8.  Central Asia Pipeline Projects.105  
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At the same time, China is diversifying the sources of and lanes for its natural gas 
pipelines to reduce geopolitical influence and promote Chinese influence across Central 
Asia.106 China and Russia signed a 30-year $400 billion natural gas deal in 2013, which 
helps Russia enlarge its European energy market and provides them a new customer in 
the Far East. China benefits by diversifying the sources of its natural gas imports and also 
by improved overall economic ties with Russia.107 In response to China’s increasing 
influence, in December 2010, the leaders of Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and 
India (TAPI) signed an agreement on the construction of a natural gas pipeline to run 
from Turkmenistan to India; this will be called the TAPI Pipeline, and the United States 
strongly backs this pipeline to diversify the flow of Central Asia energy output.108 The 
United States has also approved the construction of a trans-Caspian natural gas pipeline 
to link Central Asia natural gas with the European energy market, and the United States 
continues to state the importance of the expansion and diversification of Central Asia 
natural gas pipelines so as to balance world energy needs and protect the stability of 
Central Asia.109 
Central Asia is vital for China, primarily due to its enormous hydrocarbon 
resources. China has started to get access to those supplies thanks to extensive oil and gas 
pipeline construction in the early 2000s, and additional pipeline capacity is still under 
construction. Xi Jinping made a tour of Central Asian countries to improve relations in 
September 2013, and the trip was clearly focused on energy deals. The most important 
deal concerns the massive Kashagan offshore oil ground, situated in the Kazakh part of 
the Caspian Sea; China provided financing for the development of the oil field in 
exchange for future oil supplies. In Turkmenistan, Xi committed China to assist in the 
exploitation of the newly developed Galkynysh gas field; most of the resulting gas will 
go to China, and the Chinese have been broadly involved in developing the infrastructure 
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of the field. Turkmenistan’s exports consist nearly entirely of natural gas, most of which 
goes to the Chinese market. In Uzbekistan, some energy-related deals were signed that 
amounted to $15 billion. The projects relate to the improvement of Uzbekistan’s oil and 
gas reserves, as well as the management of its uranium reserves. The two countries also 
decided to construct a railway running from Uzbekistan through Kyrgyzstan to China. 
China granted a $3 billion loan to Kyrgyzstan. Half of the money is reserved to fund 
construction of a new gas pipeline going from Turkmenistan via Kyrgyzstan to China, 
and the rest will be assigned to several projects like the restoration of an electric power 
plant, highway construction, and the expansion of an oil refinery.110  
Even though Beijing imports a great deal of energy from Central Asia, the region 
together only amounts to 1.3 percent of China’s entire goods imports, and only about 1 
percent of China’s exports go to Central Asian countries (Figure 9).111 This is because 
China is a very big economy compared with that of the CACs. Beijing’s average 
economic growth rate between 1978 and 2012 was around 10 percent per year, which 
means that the Chinese economy doubled every seven years; the Chinese economy is 
almost 25 times larger in 2014 than it was in 1978 when Deng Xiaoping launched market 
reforms.112  
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Figure 9.  Import and export between China and CACs113 
Since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the United States has only paid a few 
high-level visits to the CACs. On the other hand, China attributes high significance to 
such visits and arranges regular visits to the CACs, which makes those nations feel 
important in the global system. In a visit to Central Asia in 2013, Xi Jinping and Li 
Keqiang announced China’s Silk Road strategy towards neighboring states and generated 
“the Chinese version of the Marshall Plan.”114 Then, in September 2013 on a trip to 
Kazakhstan, Xi stated that Beijing aimed to build the “Silk Road Economic Belt” 
together with the CACs.115 In support of this, highway/road networks will be enlarged 
first, and a plan is being considered to facilitate transportation links by building up a line 
from the Pacific Ocean to the Baltic Sea under the auspices of the SCO, which will 
connect East Asia, West Asia, and South Asia, and reach into Europe. Second, the Silk 
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Road plan will promote trade efficiency and improve the quality of the regional economy, 
which will be a win-win policy for each country. Third, this plan will strengthen currency 
flows by establishing monetary exchanges and account settlements between China and 
the CACs vis-à-vis both current and capital accounts. Correspondingly, monetary 
circulation costs between China and the CACs will be significantly reduced, the regional 
financial system of Central Asia will become more immune to risk, and the regional 
economy will become more competitive internationally.116 The Silk Road network is 
shown in Figure 10. 
 
Figure 10.  The Silk Road Network.  
1. China’s Development Strategy and the Role of Central Asia 
China has devised an analytical discourse in terms of security and development 
interaction, initially based on domestic issues, but afterwards interconnected with foreign 
policy. At the 17th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 2007, Hu Jintao, 
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then president of China, declared the notion of a harmonious society, in which 
development and security are connected.117 With the recent dramatic growth rate in 
China, Chinese society is now highly differentiated and contains multiple conflicting 
interests and a severe escalation in the economic and cultural differences between not 
only the peasants, workers, middle classes, and elites, but also between the maritime and 
continental regions.118 The CCP believes that a better distribution of wealth is needed for 
political stability; without it, the current situation might destabilize the regime and 
endanger China’s long-term interests. As for where the XUAR fits into harmonious 
society, Beijing believes that the political and ethnic tensions among the Uyghurs will 
weaken as their economy grows and as they become increasingly integrated into the 
overall Chinese political system.119 Therefore, Beijing pursues a controversial policy in 
XUAR. On the one hand, China aims to increase economic development of Xinjiang with 
$300 billion of planned investments by 2015.120 On the other hand, they repress any 
possible action that has the potential to turn into a separatist movement. Ethnic riots in 
2008, 2009, and 2011 revealed the inadequacy of the Chinese approach; investing 
enormously in the local economy and infrastructures of XUAR is not enough to 
neutralize secessionist tensions and identity conflicts.121 
CCP also wants to be perceived as one of the great global powers. Beijing 
therefore endeavors to undertake larger responsibilities, like the improvement of 
cooperation between regional institutions and international donors, and attempts to 
communicate as an equal with other major powers in international affairs. Hereafter, as a 
rising global power, China wishes to be a reliable contributor in its dealings with Africa, 
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Latin America and Central Asia, within a discourse of “mutual non-aggression, mutual 
non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, mutual benefit and peaceful coexistence, 
but also via mechanisms of development aid.”122 China does not have an official 
definition or institution for its development aid and prefers to see it as cooperation. 
Beijing wants to be an alternative to other major international donors; China not only 
participates financially in the Asian Development Bank and in some of the UN 
Development Program’s African programs, but also in the CAREC program in Central 
Asia.123 China emphasizes the “good neighborhood principal” in Central Asia by 
involving itself in the construction and upgrading of extraction infrastructures, transport 
facilities and communication systems. China perceives poverty to be the main source of 
destabilization in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, to which it now delivers the lion share of its 
aid.124  
2. China’s Foreign Aid to Central Asia 
Being the second largest economy in the world, China has the capability and 
capacity to grant development assistance and provide government investment in 
developing countries. In the early years after 2010, China increased its development 
assistance in 93 states, for both the benefit of the beneficiaries and its own interests.125 
Chinese foreign aid and government-sponsored investment activities (FAGIA) are also 
effective in Central Asia. FAGIA assistance in Central Asia grew from $27 million in 
2001 to $7.8 billion in 2011 (Figure 11) and spurred further growth from $1.4 billion in 
2008 to $6.3 billion in 2009; this increase was due in part to several great projects for 
building oil and gas pipelines and exploratory mining for copper.126 
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Chinese development aid is delivered either by sponsorships in terms of 
distribution of goods and materials to prevent the risks of corruption, or in the form of 
partisan credits. The money for loans is granted to the recipient state, which is thereafter 
assigned to the business/enterprise in charge of the project in order to keep the money 
within Chinese banks.127 China is very successful in its aid policy. First, Beijing does not 
grant assistance conditionally; it does not require reforms as a precondition for aid like 
many countries in the West do. Second, China offers loans at helpful rates, and the 
turnkey services of Chinese companies are relatively economical.128 On the other hand, 
Chinese aid does not help the CACs’ economies to become self-sufficient players in their 
own progress; Chinese aid simply intensifies the target country’s economic reliance on 
Chinese aid and products. China thereby generates new markets for its merchandise by 
“landing contracts for its companies, which are the main benefactors of its bank loans; 
guaranteeing itself new energy supplies; and making Central Asian governments its 
‘debtors’ or even its ‘vassals.’”129 
The SCO has played an important role in China’s plans in Central Asia. Until 
2010, the SCO generated projects totaling less than $100 million; this number was 
considerably increased after 2010 by the Chinese government when it provided $8 billion 
to the SCO Development Bank to finance energy, natural-resource development, and 
infrastructure projects.130 Figure 11 details this.131 
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Figure 11.  China’s Aid to Central Asia.132  
After several substantial oil and copper projects commenced in 2009, natural 
resource development in Central Asia has seen intense upsurges (Figures 11 and 12). 
FAGIA exerted a vital development surge with its aid to Kazakhstan for oil and copper 
development, two large contracts in Kyrgyzstan for building two hydropower plants, one 
large natural gas investment in Uzbekistan, and small physical infrastructure 
improvements in Tajikistan, most of which were initiated within the SCO framework to 
promote the multilateral economic cooperation among the SCO member states.133 
                                                 





Figure 12.  China’s Aid to Central Asia by Category.134 
F. CHINA’S SECURITY INTEREST IN CENTRAL ASIA 
Security is another dimension of China’s influence in Central Asia. While China’s 
overall interests initially based on border security just after the Soviet Collapse, today, 
China has enlarged its influence in terms of securing its political, economic and energy 
interests in Central Asia (Figure 13). China also combines its domestic security of 
Xinjiang with Central Asia in terms of Uyghur population. There is no foreign place 
more promising than the Central Asia region in which Beijing has the capability and 
capacity to enjoy its power under SCO to secure its interest. In this respect, China 
represents an image of regional power in Central Asia to prepare itself as superpower. 
Beijing’s national security strategy is also affecting Chinese foreign policy. 
Despite China’s growing military and economic power within a relatively stable and 
peaceful neighborhood, Chinese leaders still focus on security and feel increasingly 
vulnerable for two reasons. First, they have intimately tied regime security to overall 
national security, and second, they are heavily focused on national unity. The Chinese 
Communist Party is integral to the unity, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of the PRC. 
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While national security is related to internal stability and security for any government, 
China is particularly worried about preventing domestic unrest and suppressing political 
opposition. The CCP’s rulers are most afraid of “unrest in the heartland—the eastern 
seaboard and inland plains and river valleys where the overwhelming majority of the 
country’s populace are concentrated.”135 National unity is also very important to Chinese 
leaders, and they are accordingly afraid of unrest or greater autonomy or independence on 
the island of Taiwan or in the far west.136 The wealthy population of Taiwan remains 
mostly ethnic Han Chinese; Beijing, however, is primarily concerned by the ethnic 
minorities who are sparsely populated in remote areas and economically backward parts 
of westernmost China. Tibetans are primarily focused on the Tibetan Autonomous 
Region and Qinghai Province, and the Uyghurs are concentrated in the XUAR, which 
borders Mongolia, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, 
and India. The greatest fear of China’s leaders, though, lies in the interconnections 
between domestic challenges and external threats. Therefore, any suggestion of foreign 
help for dissidents and demonstrators or any kind of unrest movement in the motherland 
rings alarm bells in China. Both the Tibetan and Uighur diasporas flow out of China’s 
national borders, and Beijing is most sensitive to these groups’ aspirations for greater 
autonomy or separatist movements.137 
China views that any increase in independence or rights by the Uyghur endangers 
the territorial integrity of China by risking a regional loss of strategic significance. 
Additionally, any suppressive policy on basic human rights also builds a tense 
environment and any increase in Han immigration decreases the security of the Uyghur 
identity.138 For example, if the Uyghurs’ right to practice their religion is restricted, their 
identity is directly imperiled. Recently, Chinese state law has enlarged the right of 
practicing religious guidelines. This is inconsistent, however, with the bans and 
restrictions imposed upon a Mosque in Keriya, such as forbidding access for government 
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workers and youth under age 18, and time limits constraining Friday prayers to 30 
minutes.139 On the other hand, apart from Han immigration to Xinjiang, increasing 
economic inequality is also related to minority language rule. Since Uyghurs do not speak 
Mandarin—a requirement in order to get a skilled job—they have limited employment 
opportunities. The aforementioned restrictions offend the culture and identity of the 
Uyghur people and make them feel insecure, but the Chinese government perceives a 
need for these actions in order to maintain its territorial integrity. Beijing tries to control 
the Uyghur identity by limiting their religious rights and increasing Han immigration—
which “skyrocketed from 6.7 percent in 1949 to 40 percent in 2008”140—to Xinjiang, 
which in turn causes Uyghur protest. As the CACs increase their political and economic 
ties with China, they observe Beijing’s actions toward Muslim and Turkic identity in 
XUAR very carefully. China’s peaceful and soft foreign policy does not match its hard 
and aggressive policy on domestic issues. China’s foreign policy of non-interference and 
non-aggression are in contrast with Chinese domestic policy, and this makes the CACs 
suspicious about China’s ideals of non-interference and non-aggression.141  
China perceives separatist movements as a serious threat to its territorial integrity. 
Therefore, Beijing has difficulties in finding a balance between providing comprehensive 
human rights to its minorities and preventing a potential uprising. Social protests are a 
common way in democratic regimes for people to express themselves. On the contrary, in 
the Chinese authoritarian regime, social protests are considered to be an insurgency 
against the security of the state. Therefore, “ethnic conflict and Uyghur protest in XUAR 
have been securitized by the Chinese state as terrorism.”142 China rationalizes the use of 
extraordinary measures against Uyghur protests and alleged attacks under the principles 
of securitization. Beijing has also adopted a policy of global war on terror in order to 
detect, prevent, and remove terrorism from anywhere in the world. Beijing lumps Uyghur 
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activists together with Al-Qaeda when it announces that “the Eastern Turkistan Islamic 
Movement (ETIM) has become an arm of Al-Qaeda, receiving funding and training from 
them.”143 China tried to get support from the United States for its policy against terrorism 
in XUAR. Washington opposed that narrative, however, and recognized the difference 
between fighting against terrorism and non-violent separatist activities.144 Since most of 
the Uyghurs show no interest in Salafist Islam—a requirement for participation in the 
terrorist organization, ETIM—it is implausible to connect Uyghur activists to Al-Qaeda. 
Additionally, Uyghurs do not support violent action, let alone the fact that the separatist 
groups are “too small, dispersed and faceless, to be a threat to the Chinese state.”145 To 
divert public attention from its internal social policies and problems, Beijing connects 
Uyghur activists to Al-Qaeda and thus alleges an external cause as the source of unrest in 
XUAR.146 On the other hand, Chinese media frames the Uyghur people as a criminal 
“other,” and contrasts violent illegitimate Uyghur protestors to peaceful, law-abiding Han 
citizens, leading to a social division.147 By characterizing ethnic conflict in XUAR as 
terrorism, China has followed a hard policy and passed anti-terror legislation against the 
Uyghur minority that authorizes 24-hour police patrols, identity checks, and street 
searches after the deployment of counterterrorism units in Kashgar and Hotan.148 
Consequently, human rights action and legislation has become increasingly scarce and 
the situation of decreasing human rights, the growing Han Chinese population in Urumqi 
and rising hard policies only provides an environment of insecurity for the Uyghur 
people.149 
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There are legitimate reasons why ethnic conflict is being fomented by both China 
and among the Uyghur people. First, from China’s perspective, XUAR is of geostrategic 
importance, with its access to trade roads and enormous natural resources. Second, the 
possible separation of Xinjiang may cause Tibet—another autonomous region in China 
that neighbors XUAR—to pursue independence more enthusiastically. Third, as a rising 
superpower, losing land will contribute to discredit of the regime in the eye of the 
Chinese public and international arena. Fourth, since separatism is one of the evils to 
which Beijing attaches high importance, the authority of the existing Chinese regime will 
start to be questioned by its own public. Fifth, once a separatist movement starts in 
XUAR and China tries to suppress this action, China’s actions will inevitably lead to 
instability in Central Asia in terms of economy, energy security, immigration and ethnic 
conflict. Thus, China views Xinjiang’s separatist intention as a catalyst for insecurity, 
which threatens the integrity of the Chinese state. 
On the other hand, the Uyghur people have numerous reasons to feel insecure. 
First, their identity is under attack by the Chinese government, and in particular their 
religious freedom is threatened. Second, the minority language policies prevent the 
Uyghur people from getting skilled jobs, and thus they cannot enjoy the economic 
development of Xinjiang by getting higher incomes or the kind of skilled jobs that their 
Han neighbors have access to. Third, by linking Uyghur activists to external terrorist 
threats like Al-Qaeda, China has made Uyghurs very uneasy.150 
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Figure 13.  Post-Soviet Central Asia. 
In the context of China’s rise to global power, its treatment of Islam is important 
for Central Asian countries to see—in broader terms it shows China’s level of tolerance 
toward other identities—especially how China treats “the Islam extant among restive 
national minorities such as the Uyghurs.”151 The ethnic uprisings in Xinjiang in July 
2009, and violence in the region in July 2011, both tend to confirm that the problem is 
not going away. Due to strong religious, linguistic, and cultural ties with the Uyghurs, 
Central Asia is directly involved in China’s domestic concerns. China’s Uyghur 
population in Xinjiang is perceived by Beijing as being more of a separatist threat than a 
connective regional opportunity to integrate Central Asia with China. The Chinese stance 
on the Uyghur issue is very firm yet subtle. China does not want the CACs to be involved 
in the Uyghur conflict and interfere in this issue, and Beijing pressures them to stop their 
support for the Uyghurs.152  
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At the same time, Beijing attaches high importance to Central Asia in terms of 
security. An unstable Afghanistan creates a challenging environment for China, and 
Beijing fears that problems in Kabul will spill over into Central Asia, which could 
potentially disrupt Chinese access to energy and interrupt its trade in Central Asia. For 
example, Beijing concluded an agreement with Turkmenistan in 2011 covering natural 
gas that will supply 65 billion cubic meters of gas per year to China and meet a great part 
of China’s gas demand.153 China’s concern about Afghanistan makes it to meet at the 
same security base with United Sates and West. 
Since the mid-1990s, China’s overall strategy in Central Asia has been focused on 
resource extraction and trade, securing ground energy routes by importing gas from 
Turkmenistan and both gas and oil from Kazakhstan, and safeguarding China’s western 
lands from any insurgencies.154 Consequently, China has struggled for regional security 
cooperation under the institution of the SCO, which amounts to half of the world’s 
population, including the observer states.155 Thanks to the SCO, member states have 
consolidated their political and economic ties in terms of building strong mutual trust in 
the military perspective through cooperation among their defense ministries. Under SCO, 
many exercises have been conducted, ranging from collective drug trafficking mitigation, 
fighting organized crime, border security improvement, peace missions, and collaboration 
to anti-terrorism (Table 3). China seeks to develop the SCO into a more security-based 
organization. In this context, in 2014, Wang Yi—Chinese foreign minister—stated that 
“there is opportunity to build the SCO into a community of interest by expanding the 
scope of collaboration and to build up a security shield to detect and handle various 
security threats.”156 Consequently, this strategy points out Chinese deviation from the 
policy of non-interference and non-aggression.  
 
                                                 
153 Peyrouse, Boonstra, and Laruelle, “Security and Development Approaches.” 





Table 3.   China’s Participation in Multilateral Military Exercises under the 
Framework of the SCO, 2001–2013.157  
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Kyrgyzstan directly 
























More than 1,200 troops 
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exercise. In Kazakhstan, 
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Kazakh mobile infantry 
unit, a Russian 
motorized infantry 
company, and a Kyrgyz 
paratroop assault 
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to the Xinjiang Military 
District. They were 
joined by a 33-man 
Kyrgyz special warfare 
platoon. 
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China is a dominant player in Central Asia in political, economic, security, and 
energy terms, and China’s influence is increasing progressively towards making it the 
greatest power in the region. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, China’s 
concerns in Central Asia were initially related to border security with Central Asia and 
the stabilization of its minority Muslim province of Xinjiang. Today, Beijing’s 
connections with Central Asia are mostly focused on issues related to the extraction of 
energy and the creation of a secure region; China’s attempts to revive the Silk Road can 
be viewed in terms of providing China an alternative trade route to reduce its heavy 
dependence on the sea lanes. Also, as a rising global player, China is showing its power 
with military exercises under the SCO, and is thereby consolidating its economic 
influence in Central Asia by building higher economic bilateral and multilateral relations 
with each country in the region. Since the CACs are considered developing economies 
and have proven willing to cooperate for the sake of growth, China’s economic influence 
directly affects the political relations countries in the region in a manner which, on the 
surface, appears to be consistent with China’s peaceful rise policy towards Central Asia.  
China does not have an independent foreign policy in Central Asia. Since it is 
very sensitive towards its territorial integrity, China’s domestic policy—particularly as it 
relates to XUAR and its Uyghur population—informs Beijing’s overall strategy in 
Central Asia. Central Asia’s energy resources and alternative trade routes also provide 
access to the West and lead China to engage heavily in the region. What is more, as a 
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rising global power, China’s approach towards its Muslim minority in Xinjiang 
influences its overall policy towards the Muslim world, which is important for China’s 
acceptance in the international arena as a superpower, and in terms of competition with 
the United States and gaining the sympathy of Muslim nations. Therefore, as a rising 
global power, China’s influence in Central Asia is interconnected with its domestic 
policy and foreign policy. Since the Xinjiang Autonomous region is vulnerable to 
separatist movements and ethnic conflict, Xinjiang is a key area for Beijing to build and 
consolidate its foreign policy in Central Asia; similarly, Central Asia is a key area for 
China to showcase an attractive program to the overall Muslim world and beyond.  
The economic influence of China’s role in Central Asia is dominant in each of the 
five Central Asian countries for which China has become a major economic partner 
through natural resource extraction projects, investments in infrastructure, low-interest 
loans, and foreign aid. More than ten percent of China’s oil and gas imports now comes 
from Central Asia. To diversify its energy suppliers, and to keep stability and security in 
its Xinjiang region, China’s economic engagement with Central Asia has generated the 
‘the New Great Game’ that directly influences the interests of Russia, Europe, and the 
United States. To some extent, Beijing’s economic dynamism and expansion have the 
potential to be a win-win solution in the region. With the help of economic relations and 
cooperation, the CACs’ foreign currency reserves have increased, their finances have 
become more secure, and there has been a corresponding rise in investment and 
development.158 Not only has China benefitted from such economic cooperation, but the 
CACs also view increasing Chinese trade and investment as a catalyst for their growth.159 
Additionally, since the CACs do not have a sponsor—as the United States is for a country 
like South Korea—and even though they are aware of their heavy reliance on China, they 
try to follow a correct strategy for the benefit of their nations, on that is relatively more 
useful than their relations with Russia. What is more, the United States does not focus 
enough on Central Asia, despite the increasing influence of the rising global power of 
China. 
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In this context, China’s authoritarian regime, domestic problems, and huge energy 
demand hold potential threats for the long-term stability of Central Asia, particularly in 
terms of the diversification theory of war. To sustain the survival of the regime, China 
may risk open aggression in Central Asia to divert domestic public opinion from internal 
matters such as corruption, separatist movements, pollution, etc., particularly under the 
pretext of the Uyghur question. Since the CACs are not strong enough to withstand the 
possibility of Chinese aggression alone, they are more likely to cooperate with or accept 
Chinese-run policies in Central Asia in order to achieve a win-win policy. This will 
gradually violate the legitimacy of the CACs in terms of adopting Chinese policies about 
the Uyghur population and Beijing’s everlasting demand for energy in the long run. 
Consequently, unless the CACs take strong steps now to balance against Chinese 
influence by cooperating with the West, China’s win-win policy in Central Asia will 
likely turn out to be a win-lose game in which China becomes the sole hegemon in 
control of all Central Asia. 
 
 55
III. THE INFLUENCE OF THE TURKISH REPUBLIC IN 
CENTRAL ASIA 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will show the influence of the Turkish Republic in Central Asia and, 
as a model country for the CACs, the degree of contribution of Ankara to the long-term 
stability of Central Asia. 
Turkey’s power in Central Asia is middle-tier. This means that Turkey attaches 
special significance to preventive diplomacy, generates important mediation efforts in an 
extensive geographic area, and endeavors actively for the peaceful resolution of conflicts 
in that region. Given the historical, ethnic, linguistic, religious and cultural links, and 
taking into account the dynamics of existing diplomatic, economic, development, and 
security cooperation in Central Asia, Turkey has significant influence in Central Asia.160 
Also, Turkey has very good potential assets to convert to influence in the region. For 
example, Ankara is a dialogue partner of the SCO. As a significant member of NATO and 
a European Union candidate country, Turkey functions not only as a bridge between the 
EU and the SCO, but also between NATO and the SCO. Turkey is not only a 
multidimensional intersection between East and West at the global level, but also a center 
country and democratic model state for the CACs at the regional level. If Turkey can 
combine its strong natural ties to the CACs with its potential assets under a joint effort of 
the CACs, this will contribute to the long-term stability of Central Asia in the context of 
economy, development, politics, and security. Since the CACs have always been 
influenced and directed by external actors, to promote and maximize the development of 
Central Asia at the regional level, Turkey should help the CACs to act with their own will 
and with a joint effort.  
To analyze Turkey’s influence and potential role in Central Asia, first, this 
chapter examines Turkish relations and interactions with the CACs after the dissolution 
of the Soviet Union. The reasons behind Turkey’s unsuccessful attempt to be a model 
                                                 
160 Wheeler, “Turkey’s Role and Interest in Central Asia,” 12. 
 56
country in Central Asia are identified. Second, information is provided about Turkey’s 
and the CACs’ ties within bilateral/multilateral relations and the level of their cooperation 
in the context of economy, security, education, and geopolitics. Third, the chapter 
considers how Turkey can be a model country under the joint effort of the CACs. 
B. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TURKEY AND THE CACS AFTER 
THE COLLAPSE OF THE SOVIET UNION 
Turkey’s foreign policy burst forth in the 1990s just after the disintegration of the 
Soviet Union. Turgut Ozal, president of Turkey between 1990 and 1993, played an 
important role in this political spurt as the architect of Turkey’s neo-liberal economic 
reforms. Turkey was the first to recognize the independence of the CACs in 1991. This 
step was followed by strong bilateral diplomatic efforts to forge close ties. During the 
Cold War period, Turkey had a critical geostrategic position in the Western alliance and 
NATO, standing as a bulwark against Soviet aggression in the south.161 At end of the 
Cold War, Turkey got new opportunities and constraints. Following the Soviet Union’s 
disintegration, Turkey’s geostrategic value to the West was not as precise as it had 
been.162 Furthermore, the rejection of Turkey’s request to become a full member of the 
European Union could be correlated, to some extent, with the uncertain/undefined role of 
Turkey after the Cold War. Turkey’s embrace of the CACs also represented an essential 
psychological dimension. Turkey would prove its importance to itself and understand its 
own value in an active role of reshaping Central Asia. Thus, Turkey would be a rational 
regional actor and gain its self-confidence after the long tiring years of the Cold War. It 
was also anticipated that an active guidance role in Central Asia would help to refresh 
Turkey’s strategic importance to the West and, thereby, develop its own economic and 
security relations. 
The Soviet Union’s collapse and the appearance of newly independent states in 
Central Asia gave remarkable opportunities to Turkey in building a new status as an 
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influential regional power. Turkey focused on ethnic, cultural, and linguistic ties with the 
five Central Asian states (linguistically less so with Tajikistan) to construct their 
economic development, political direction, and international relations. The model of 
Turkey as a modern, secular, Westernized, and market-oriented country was an attractive 
example for these states for a new start. Theoretically, the United States and Europe 
supported this policy out of fear of the spread of an unwanted Iranian Islamist model in 
Central Asia, which was a needless anxiety since Iran had substantial kinship only with 
Tajikistan, and then only in terms of the nearly identical Farsi and Tajiki languages. 
Contrary to Turkey’s model, the West has never appreciated the regime of Iran. 
Therefore, the CACs were reluctant to accept any stronger influence of Iran. To some 
extent, the West’s support of Turkey weakened proportionately with the emergence of the 
fragile influence of Iran in the region.  
Turkey endeavored to construct new policies on the robust cultural and linguistic 
links with the CACs. In this context, the Turkish Cooperation and Development Agency 
(TIKA) was established, and the first annual summit including the presidents of Turkey 
and the CACs met in Ankara in October 1992.163 Thereby, this organization represented 
an effort to institutionalize the relationship of Ankara with the CACs. On the other hand, 
in Turkey, non-governmental organizations tried to build and consolidate close cultural 
and economic ties with the new states of Central Asia. Turkish entrepreneurs built 
businesses and non-governmental organizations focused on cultural activities such as 
forming educational organizations to grow up the future elites, with the aim of promoting 
their close ties with Ankara.164 
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C. THE REASONS FOR TURKEY’S FAILURE TO BE A MODEL 
COUNTRY FOR THE CENTRAL ASIAN COUNTRIES 
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Turkey was a good model of secular 
democracy for a Muslim majority nation, which was an agreeable notion to the newly 
built governments of the young CACs. Ankara intended to increase its relationship with 
the CACs as a Turkic community under its own leadership, an idea adopted by former 
Turkish President Turgut Ozal. For Turkey’s part, this cooperation not only would benefit 
Turkey economically and politically and would serve as a bridge to the Islamic post-
Soviet world, but also would display Ankara’s effectiveness to the West.165 As for the 
CACs, they would develop not only with their own dynamics, but also with a supportive 
and helpful process under a regional teamwork. Turkey provided a good example of a 
democratic country as a model for the countries in the region. The CACs welcomed this 
useful approach that was not offending and exploiting them, which was different from the 
previous/current aggressive powers. 
In the first several years, more than 300 agreements were signed between Turkey 
and the CACs.166 Ankara established the TIKA under its Foreign Ministry in 1992 to 
bolster Turkish relations with the CACs. Thousands of students and public servants from 
Central Asia went to Turkey for education and training. Turkey enhanced its ties with the 
Turkic world with Turkic summits. Hundreds of Turkish firms came to these countries 
and many joint projects have been formed in different areas.167 Thousands of students 
were granted scholarships by the Ankara. The volume of trade between the two sides 
reached almost $4 billion.168 On the other hand, the Turkic states offered opportunities 
for Turkey to reduce its energy dependence on the Middle East in terms of oil and natural 
gas. Turkey promised to assist the CACs to develop them economically. As a result, “the 
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Ozal leadership considered Turkey as the “power center” for the Turkish world to be one 
of the “major league countries.”169  
After economic crises and terrorism issues in Turkey during the 1990s, the 
situation changed. The role of Turkey as a model and bridge country was interrupted. Aid 
from Turkey to Central Asia fell short of expectations, and economic cooperation 
remained limited. Intentions of promoting democracy and political liberalization largely 
failed, and Turkey accepted local regimes as they were.170 Having just won 
independence, CACs were hesitant to embrace Ankara’s role of leadership because of 
larger powers, such as China, who were courting the region.171 Also, Turkish President 
Ozal’s death in 1993 contributed much to the decreasing influence of Ankara in terms of 
strong leadership in Central Asia. What is more, Russia found its identity in a very short 
time after changing from the Soviet Union, and showed its eagerness to be an active 
player in Central Asia. Correspondingly, the economic, political, and military 
organization of the Shanghai Five was established in 1996 by the leaders of China, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan. After the joining of Uzbekistan in 2001, 
it changed its name to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Since Turkmenistan 
declared its permanent neutrality, it did not enter this organization. Thus, China and 
Russia started to increase their influence after just five years from the independence of 
the CACs, which were mostly relying on the insufficient policies of both the West and 
Turkey to fill the power vacuum in Central Asia. The former dominant supremacy of the 
Soviet Union in Central Asia started to be mostly shared between the two nuclear powers 
of China and Russia, with an institutionalized organization against/alternative to NATO 
and the EU. Thus, Central Asia gained a potential role as a military, economic, and 
political frontline between the West and East in a redesigned world order. 
On the other hand, misperception about the CACs’ rapid transition to democracy 
was a mistake of the West. The effort of the West to inject the democratic principles in 
the guidance of Turkey without building any institutions to help the new CACs to 
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promote democratic rule backfired. What is more, SCO made the basis for CACs to 
sustain a similar regime of Russia or China, a kind of authoritarian administration. The 
transition of the CACs to democracy would bring democracy to the border of China and 
Russia. In addition to energy resources and trade routes in Central Asia, to some extent, 
China and Russia took initiative to prevent the democracies from being promoted to the 
East, to the very border of their motherland. Thus, economic loans, seemingly as indirect 
influence, from China to Central Asia encouraged and inspired the CACs to follow 
authoritarian regimes. After suffering the long years of the Cold War, under a closed 
system in terms of restriction of free communication, those countries, particularly their 
public, could not find a chance to learn the benefits of democratic regimes, which was not 
consistent with the expectation of the West. Since the cognitive awareness of the public 
of the CACs for democracy was not high, they could not show their expected desire for 
democratic regimes. Turkey and the West failed to direct the CACs into a truly 
democratic pathway. It was disregarded that democracy takes some time to be integrated 
with its values into the system of a country. The impatient unprepared action plan of 
redesigning Central Asia and misperception of the West for the CACs created 
opportunities for the influence of China and Russia in Central Asia. 
The reluctance and cold approach of the West for a potential Turkic Union, or a 
misperception of the so-called new Ottomanism of Turkey, also caused the CACs to 
come closer to Russia and China.  
It is wrong to fear the perspectives of building good relations between 
Turkey and Central Asia allegedly thinking that these relations would lead 
to pan-Turkism or even (more absurdly) to pan-Islamism. There are not 
any viable chances of creating ‘pan-Turkism.’ Moreover it is not only non-
viable but it would be like ‘pure fantasy,’ since as a result of modernistic 
transformations of all Turkic societies experienced in the course of 20th 
century…172 
In addition to their lack of strong and sustainable support for Turkey’s being an 
active player, the EU and NATO failed to envisage the future projection of Central Asia. 
                                                 




As part of the West and with/without the assistance from it, Turkey was also unsuccessful 
in building a strong union in Central Asia under a regional institution as a unified 
regional power next to two nuclear powers, Russia and China. The failure of the West led 
to the building of the SCO, to a large extent, as an alternative to the West. Actually, given 
the robust ties of Turkey and the CACs, these links should necessitate and justify Turkey 
to build a union more than any other organization and play an active role for the overall 
benefit of Central Asia, and this union would be beneficial for the West in terms of their 
alliance with Ankara. 
D. THE PROGRESS OF TURKEY’S RELATIONS WITH CENTRAL ASIAN 
COUNTRIES 
Central Asia is not only strategically and geopolitically crucial for providing the 
security and stability for the Euro-Atlantic region, but also is important with energy 
resources for world energy security and distribution with the gas and oil pipelines, as well 
as trade routes. After their independence, the CACs have made considerable 
advancement in numerous fields, predominantly in consolidating their sovereignty, 
strengthening their institutions, and stimulating the degree of integration and interaction 
with the international arena. Ankara was the first country to recognize the independence 
of the CACs. Turkey expected the CACs to build free market economies and functioning 
democracies. Given historical, linguistic, and cultural ties, Ankara wanted to enhance 
engagement with the CACs both bilaterally and multilaterally.173 Thus, Turkey initiated 
the High Level Strategic Cooperation Council with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, and the 
Cooperation Council with Tajikistan to provide a basis for developing cooperation. 
Turkey is very pleased with the peaceful democratic change in Kyrgyzstan and supports 
the launching of democratic rule in Bishkek.174 The strong step of Kyrgyzstan toward 
democracy is very crucial for the democratization process of all Central Asia as a region. 
A successful democracy among the CACs would highly influence the rest of the states to 
pursue a similar path, which will contribute heavily to regional peace and security. 
                                                 




Correspondingly, Kazakhstan also made progress in creating a multi-party system with 
general elections on January 15, 2012. Ankara supports democratic advances because a 
democratic and stable Central Asia will not only develop the CACs but also will integrate 
the region with Eurasia and the rest of the world in terms of modernity. 
Turkey’s economic ties with the CACs have advanced swiftly, particularly in the 
areas of trade, transportation, and communication. Ankara assisted the CACs with loans 
of around 1 billion USD through Eximbank. Since the independence of the CACs, 
Turkey has also granted about 1 billion USD in foreign aid to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan, which corresponds to one-fourth of Ankara’s overall 
foreign aid of for the same term. The trade of Turkey with the CACs was 6.5 billion USD 
in 2010, and the overall investments of Turkish companies in Central Asia surpassed 4.7 
billion USD.175 Turkish companies have exceeded 50 billion USD of trade volume. Two 
thousand Turkish firms now operate, or have operated, on the ground in Central Asia. 
Ankara signed multiple bilateral agreements in customs, energy transportation, tourism, 
and technical assistance. More than 1,000 Turkish companies attained a substantial 
market share in the construction, telecommunication, banking, textile, and retail 
sectors.176 Thus, Turkey has become a significant investor in Central Asia. Ankara also 
endeavors to serve as a door for CACs’ trade and energy transit via the TRACECA and 
NABUCCO cooperation network.177  
Export volume from Turkey to the CACs increased from 509.7 million USD in 
1996 to 2,124.0 million USD in 2009. Its economic status, however, differs from country 
to country. Turkmenistan ranks first in the percentage of this aid received. In 2009, it 
imported Turkish goods for a total value of 944.9 million USD.178 Turkish businessmen 
have high influence on transportation, construction and communication, tourism and 
retail trade in Turkmenistan. Over the past two decades, Turkish constructions firms 
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finished more than 600 projects valued at 21 billion USD. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan 
also succeeded in attracting important sectors of Turkish businesses.  
Turkey has also built up significant bonds with the CACs in terms of culture and 
education. The International Organization of Turkic Culture (TURKSOY) was 
established in 1993 in order to promote Turkic values in culture, art, language, and 
history. TURKSOY aims to transfer values to the younger generations and introduce 
them to the world. Ankara also has been running a comprehensive scholarship program, 
Great Student Project, for students in the CACs. There are many Turkish schools under 
the Ministry of Education or private organizations in the CACs. The Turkish-Kazakh 
International Hoca Ahmet Yesevi University functions in Turkestan, Kazakhstan, and the 
Turkish-Kyrgyz Manas University operates in Bishkek. Turkey initiated “The Summits 
of Turkic Speaking Countries’ Heads of States,” held since 1992 to enhance solidarity 
among the Turkic-speaking countries and to strengthen cooperation with this 
organization. Thanks to the Nakhichevan Treaty for the Establishment of the Cooperation 
Council of Turkic Speaking States (Turkic Council) signed on October 3, 2009, the 
organization was embodied as an institution and the Secretariat of the Council was 
established in Istanbul.179 
E. WHAT KIND OF ROLES CAN TURKEY UNDERTAKE IN CENTRAL 
ASIA? 
Following the Cold War, Turkey acted on its interest in Central Asia in order to 
assist those newly independent countries in their nation-building process. Due to the 
outcome of the Cold War, Turkey was asked by its Western allies to develop its relations 
with the regional countries. Because of the neutral and passive approach of the United 
States toward this region, the growing economic engagement and geographic position did 
not work in favor of Ankara.180 In addition to Turkey’s emerging domestic problems just 
after the Cold War, such as an economic crisis and terrorism, Ankara also did not get 
sustainable support from the West for its policy in Central Asia. Since the terrorist attacks 
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of September 11, 2001, the changes of policy between the United States and Central Asia 
have caused shifts in the dynamics of the regional countries.181 To a large extent, the 
United States acts according to its own interests instead of cooperating with Turkey as an 
intermediary country in Central Asia. 
Some countries can even build strong relationships with shared historical events 
such as United Sates and South Korea. The Turkish Republic has more commonalities 
with CACs than any other interstate relations. Cultural characteristics at the national level 
influence interstate negotiations and cultural similarities influence the attitudes of the 
countries toward each other along two related dimensions: affinity and trust.182 When 
countries have friendly and cultural-based relations, they are more likely to cooperate, 
settling their differences peacefully through conciliation.183 Similarly, Turkey has strong 
incentives to cooperate with Central Asian countries since it has very strong ties under 
the sense of brotherhood. Turkey refers to these countries as brother states. According to 
Turkish culture, brothers do their best for each other and sacrifice their interest on behalf 
of their brothers. Since there are potential aggressors, Turkey is required to help and 
promote CACs. Turkey aims to build strong relations with CACs without selfish motives. 
Turkey’s foreign aid and it willingness to embrace Iraq’s immigrants during the Gulf War 
and some two million Syrian immigrants in 2014 shows that Turkey follows a 
humanitarian foreign policy in terms of collaboration and cooperation. Turkish 
development cooperation of its foreign policy can be viewed as a “type of ‘trust-building 
measure’ that serves the overriding goals of developing good relations with the 
neighboring regions and enabling the country to profile itself as a regional power.”184 In 
this respect, Turkey proves itself to undertake extra economic cost without disregarding 
realistic and pragmatist interests. In this context, most of the countries admire Turkey’s 
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complimentary generous aid and assistance to the foreigners who are in need of help. In 
2013, Turkey ranked first with $1.6 billion in the list of donations when compared to 
gross national income.185 Thus, Turkey verifies its well-intentioned and friendly 
approach not only in the world but also in Central Asia. Therefore, for CACs, Turkey is 
the best model and counterpart to cooperation. As can be understood from the Turkish 
foreign policy of ‘Peace at home and abroad,’ Turkey wants to contribute the 
development of Central Asia without causing harm to any country. 
Today, since Turkey gives special importance to Central Asia for being the land 
of its ancestors, and thanks to Ankara’s robust historical, ethnic, linguistic, religious, and 
cultural ties with the CACs, Turkey can play an important role in the overall development 
of Central Asia, with the cooperation of the CACs. First, as a good example of a secular 
democratic regime, Turkey can demonstrate the benefits of democracy with its 
institutions—acting as simply a model that the other nations can emulate if they choose. 
Thus, Turkey will be a bridge between the West and the CACs in terms of increasing the 
wealth of these countries. The positive aspects of the West can be transferred from 
Turkey to these countries. Second, Turkey can be a mediator to solve the current disputes 
in Central Asia, such as the matter of the Fergana Valley186 among Uzbekistan, 
Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan or the potential water problems that all the CACs face.187 It 
can also act as a balancer, with the cooperation of the CACs, against the potential 
aggressive influence of China and Russia or other actors. In this respect, Ankara has 
already proved itself to the outside World as a secure and non-interfering regional player 
and thus plays a teaching role not only to the CACs, but also to the powerful, and 
meddling external actors.188  Third, Turkey can be an economic model to the CACs; thus, 
these states can develop on their own with cooperation and sponsorship. Fourth, parallel 
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to the CACs’ democratization process, Turkey can help the CAC states to build their new 
modern armies with the cooperation of the West. Finally, Turkey can be an educational 
model to the CACs, which is vital to raise the next generation of these countries. 
Friendly relations between Central Asian states and Turkey can be seen as 
‘win – win’ situation for every party/ side—it is the truth which is usually 
overlooked. It is beneficial for Central Asian states as they can find more 
opportunities to increase their competitiveness, build more pluralistic and 
democratic societies and integrate with the outside world; it is beneficial 
for Turkey as it can increase the number of partners sharing some common 
values and find new markets for its economy. It is beneficial for Russia, as 
it has been seen that the friendly relations and sustainable partnership 
between Turkey and Central Asia tend to be rested upon inclusive identity 
building within which Russia as a power, civilization and culture is an 
indispensable component in Central Asian and Eurasian context; all in all 
Moscow should not ‘worry’ that its ‘near abroad’ is contested by ‘pan-
Turkic alien power’ which represent unviable and unrealizable scenario. It 
is beneficial for the Western powers as they will see the Central Asian 
states developing to the direction of building sustainable economies and 
societies lucrative for pouring investments and not producing extremists 
and narcotics, the last is also very important for Russia and China.189 
F. CONCLUSION 
After the independence of the CACs in the early 1990s, Turkey showed 
remarkable diplomatic efforts in assisting the newly independent countries to build up 
functioning modern states in a stabilized region, and to integrate those states into the 
international system. This was done under the leadership of former Turkish President 
Turgut Ozal. Within this framework, Turkey was the first country to recognize the 
independence declarations of all the CACs. Ankara started to develop relations through 
increasing the number of high-level visits that promised trade agreements and free capital 
flow to improve bilateral economic cooperation. Students from the CACs were accepted 
in Turkey for their education and new schools built up in Central Asia. Air transportation 
increased. TIKA was created to assist the CACs at an institutional level. To show its 
interest, Turkey allocated the majority of its overseas aid to the development of Central 
                                                 




Asia. Meanwhile, regular summits of the leaders of the Turkic-speaking states were 
organized from 1992 onward.  
The death of former Turkish President Turgut Ozal—who had functioned as the 
prime motivator for the overall development of Central Asia—and Turkey’s economic 
and terrorism problems in its own southeastern region caused an interruption in the 
influence of Ankara in the late 1990s. External actors such as China and Russia made use 
of this power gap in Central Asia to increase their influence through methods such as the 
SCO. In the reshaped order of Central Asia, old neighbors appeared with new roles to 
influence the region, either with institutions or multilateral/bilateral cooperation. 
Starting from the 2000s by developing its institutions with the interaction of the 
West, Turkey has become a more obvious international actor. With a population of 
almost 80 million, which is about equal to all the CACs combined, Turkey’s economic 
growth developed positively. Ankara enjoyed a significant GDP growth rate of 6 percent, 
on average, between 2002 and 2011. Correspondingly, per capita income increased to 
over 10,000 USD in 2011, up from 3,500 USD in 2002. The Turkish economy achieved a 
growth rate of 9.2 percent and 8.5 percent in 2010 and 2011, respectively. According to 
the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, Turkey today is the 17th largest 
economy in the world, with a GDP of over 800 billion USD.190 In addition to its 
economic strength, Turkey is a model country because of its geographic, religious, ethnic, 
cultural, and historical ties with the CACs. In this context, Turkey’s development process 
fits best for the CACs. Nevertheless, Turkey needs a new applicable, feasible, and 
realistic action plan for the long-term stability of Central Asia. 
Overall, Turkey should unite its strong natural ties to the CACs with the common 
desire of those countries for change and development, which will make a big positive 
change for the long-term stability of Central Asia. Since external large players have 
always influenced the CACs according to their own interests and the CACs have 
improved themselves a lot until now, Turkey should follow the course of helping to 
develop Central Asia at the regional level according to its own dynamics. Functioning as 
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a model country, Turkey should guide the CACs with a shared action plan of 
development under their own joint efforts. 
 69
IV. THE INFLUENCE OF RUSSIA, THE UNITED STATES, THE 
EU, INDIA, IRAN, AND PAKISTAN IN CENTRAL ASIA 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will review Russian, American, European Union, Indian, Iranian, 
and Pakistani political, economic, and security influences in Central Asia to make an 
overall judgment in Chapter V to answer whether Turkey can balance Chinese influence 
in Central Asia.  
After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, 15 new states emerged. Among 
these, the five CACs have faced stormy challenges. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan have also made considerable advances since 1991, 
however. They have built independent states with free governments, and generated new 
national traditions and social life. The CACs have built foreign relations and joined 
international organizations such as the United Nations, the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe, NATO’s Partnership for Peace Program, and the SCO, just to 
name a few. Despite economic and initial nation-building difficulties, the CACs 
succeeded in surviving; Central Asia, however, “remains fragile and sometimes volatile 
[and] requires greater attention and a more sustained focus.”191  
The Central Asia region, including the energy-rich Caspian Sea and Xinjiang, is 
important due to its vast economic resources and geo-strategic location.192 Central Asia is 
a strategic region for connecting East to West on the ground, where the legendary Silk 
Road has provided and still offers trade routes. At each different timeframe of history, 
Central Asia has earned a strategic importance. External actors have seen Central Asia as 
an economic and strategic window to other parts of the world, and thus this region has 
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been a conduit for trade, competition and sometimes conflict.193 For almost the last two 
centuries, Central Asia has been a pawn in the “Great Game,” due to the struggle of 
external players to influence and balance each other in this geostrategic field. Thus, South 
and Central Asia have been disconnected by Great Power policies in terms of trade and 
culture, which caused the peoples of the region to lose their sense of commonality.194 
India’s colonization by Britain and Central Asia’s annexation by Russia led to dramatic 
changes in each region. The former shifted trade direction toward the sea and the latter 
almost stopped the Silk Road from existing.195 Although Central Asia was mostly 
disregarded during the Cold War, its significance was shortly rediscovered in terms of 
energy, energy security and ground trade routes.196 Energy resources in Central Asia 
make the CACs important partners for foreign powers. Today, there is another pending 
game between new players—mainly Russia and China but also the United States, EU, 
Turkey, India, Pakistan and Iran—for influence in Central Asia.197 Meanwhile, the newly 
independent countries of Central Asia try to manage and balance the external players by 
building bilateral/multilateral cooperation. Since this region is open to potential 
aggressors and security threats such as from Al-Qaeda, internal and external players meet 
mostly on the security basis to maintain the stability of Central Asia in order, mostly, to 
guarantee access to energy. Figure 14 shows this vital region.  
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Figure 14.  Central Asia.198 
B. THE INFLUENCE OF RUSSIA IN CENTRAL ASIA 
After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Russia—as a new country—initially 
was interested in Central Asia primarily for security reasons, such as securing its southern 
borders, denuclearization, rental of the Baikonur Cosmodrome in Kazakhstan, sustaining 
its dominant stakeholder status of natural gas, and sending peacekeeping troops to the 
Tajik civil war in the early 1990s.199   
The late 1990s brought the Primakov Doctrine, which viewed Central Asia as a 
part of Russia’s “near-abroad” for regaining Russia’s international position by placing 
Central Asia at the center of influence over former-Soviet states.200 The framework of 
this policy remained vague since official discourse was mostly concentrated on building a 
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Euro-Atlantic alliance.201 Nevertheless, this strategy allowed Russia to regain strong 
influence in Central Asia.202 Russian economic and security interests in Central Asia 
were redesigned and flourished in the beginning of the 2000s, focusing mainly on 
Kazakhstan and to a lesser extent Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.203 Moscow’s objective in 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan was “to gain a firm hold over the sale of highly profitable oil 
products,” while Gazprom, a Russian company selling natural gas, undertook the 
exploration of Tajik gas deposits in Sargazon and Rengan, as well as in Kyrgyzstan’s 
south.204 
Since Central Asia lacks access to seaports, being landlocked, Russia is 
geographically very important for the CACs for the transportation of merchandise to 
nearby countries.205 Russia’s economic commitment to Central Asia reaches into 
different fields such as mining, construction, military merchandise, communications, 
transport, and agriculture.206 Thus, Russia became the dominant economic player in 
Central Asia until the late 2000s. Nevertheless, Russia has failed to remain the number 
one trade partner of the Central Asian countries. China now holds this place.207 Russia 
still holds the dominant energy trade in Central Asia and mostly in Kazakhstan, however, 
and Moscow wants to control the Central Asian hydrocarbon resources, raw materials 
and assets. Therefore, Central Asia is vital for Russian interests. 
There are different organizations strengthening Russia’s relationship with the 
CACs in terms of security and economy. Four of the CACs joined the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS) but Turkmenistan, the fifth one, suspended its membership and 
holds observer status (Table 4). In 2010, Kazakhstan entered the Customs Union (CU) 
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with Russia and Belarus; the three CU member states form a Common Economic Space 
(CES) based on the World Trade Organization (WTO) principles and open for the 
accession of other states. Four CA countries are currently members of the Collective 
Security Treaty Organization (CSTO); Uzbekistan suspended its membership in June 
2012 and Turkmenistan, having announced its neutrality in 1995, never joined. 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan are members of the EuroAsian Economic 
Community (EurASEC), while Uzbekistan also suspended its membership in this 
organization.208 These bilateral/multilateral relations not only help Russia to cooperate 
with the CACs and to increase its influence in Central Asia, but also serve as stabilizer 
institutions to balance the region against the other external players. 
Table 4.   Participation of CACs to Organizations.209 




CSTO SCO WTO    CAREC*
Russia  + + + + + + +  





Uzbekistan + Membership 
suspended 
since 2008 













Kyrgyzstan + +  + + + + + 
Turkmenist
an 
**       + 
*Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC), **Associate member since 2006 
                                                 




Since Russia is the former colonizer of Central Asia and Russian culture and 
language still hold sway in the area, Moscow has significant influence in Central Asia, 
and the CAC elites see the Russian regime as a possible model for their countries, which 
facilitates the role of Moscow as a leading strategic, military, and trade partner.210 Russia 
also has significant soft power tools in Central Asia. First, Russian is the most spoken 
international language in Central Asia and has official status in three countries, in 
Kyrgyzstan as a bilingual language and in Tajikistan and Kazakhstan as an interethnic 
language.211 Second, there are significant Russian minorities in the CACs, particularly in 
Kazakhstan, which increases Russian interest and interaction. Third, Central Asian 
political and intellectual elites were mostly educated in Russia. Fourth, the CAC 
militaries originated from former Soviet entities, particularly in terms of education. 
Similarly, Russia-CACs military cooperation contains the provision of military 
equipment and collaboration between military-industrial organizations.212 Therefore, 
Russia has gained strong ties with the CACs, and is still vying for influence in Central 
Asia like the other international actors.213  
Today, controlling energy resources and sustaining regional security are Russia’s 
main goals in Central Asia.214 Russia has a significant influence in Central Asia in terms 
of security and economy, which is difficult for other actors such as India, Iran and Turkey 
to challenge in the foreseeable future.215 Russia places high importance on maintaining 
political influence over the CACs through the control of resources and continuing to gain 
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substantial transit revenues from these landlocked states.216 Correspondingly, to balance 
the emergence of competing export roads from Central Asia to China, Iran and Turkey 
and to meet rising European energy demands, Moscow wants to sustain its influence over 
the CACs. Nevertheless, the geo-strategic atmosphere of Central Asia encourages new 
routes to disrupt the monopoly of Russia.217 
C. THE INFLUENCE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA IN 
CENTRAL ASIA 
Central Asia was a far away, low-priority region for the United States in the 
1990s.218 At the close of the Cold War, U.S. presence in Central Asia in terms of 
financial aid and international support showed the promise of a strong relationship. The 
United States established embassies in all five CAC capitals and offered billions in 
assistance, educated thousands of students from this region, and assisted in the founding 
of the American University of Central Asia in Kyrgyzstan.219 U.S. security aid has 
facilitated to create militaries and found operative counter-narcotics agencies, and thus, 
intelligence and law enforcement support have assisted area administrations to start 
dealing with international terrorism and organized crime.220 Nevertheless, the CACs did 
not get enough help from Washington, not even as much as South Korea. Thus, the 
opportunities for democratization of these countries have been neutralized by Russian 
and Chinese authoritarian models.221 The United States did not build a strong relationship 
with the CACs and gain a dominant influence in Central Asia, certainly not as much 
influence as one would expect from a superpower. After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the 
United States increased its influence in this region mostly because of Afghanistan.222 The 
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United Sates built military bases and signed security cooperation agreements with all 
CACs. On the one hand, Washington has endeavored to engage the authoritarian regimes 
of the CACs in a regional security arrangement against terrorism, while on the other hand 
calling for domestic reforms in the form of democracy.223 The CACs viewed U.S. desire 
for democracy as a late interest and viewed the intention of the United States as a pretext 
to increase its influence in this region.224 After the Tulip Revolution and collapse of 
Askar Akaev’s regime in Kyrgyzstan, U.S. democratization policy in this region was 
perceived as a threat by the current regimes of the CACs.225 Correspondingly, 
Uzbekistan’s government evicted U.S. forces from the Karshi-Khanabad (K2) base 
showing that external demand for democratization would not be accepted, even at the 
cost of the Afghanistan-related security cooperation.226 This showed that there are other 
external players dominating in Central Asia. Therefore, the United States stopped 
demanding political reforms from CAC regimes and focused on increasing its influence 
on regional security and economic ties. Originally, U.S. interests stemmed from Central 
Asia’s closeness to Russia and China, and American commitment in Central Asia mainly 
focused on strategic policy and was “not primarily associated with access to energy or an 
attempt to democratize the region, as is often alleged.”227 At the regional level, the policy 
of the United Sates in Central Asia has focused on its cooperation with the CACs in order 
to stabilize the efforts of NATO in Afghanistan and to fight against terrorism; 
proliferation; and trafficking in arms, drugs, and people.228  
U.S. policy objectives concerning energy resources in the CACs have supported 
CACs bonds with the West, encouraging U.S. private investment, promoting NATO and 
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European energy security through varied providers, helping NATO’s ally Turkey, and 
“opposing the building of pipelines that transit energy competitor Iran or otherwise give 
it undue influence over the region.”229 The United States works to build robust bilateral/
multilateral trade and investment links with the CACs, developing Central Asian 
economies into growing markets for U.S. exports and services and strategic destinations 
for investment in fields such as oil, gas, mining, manufacturing, and food processing.230 
U.S. initiatives involve efforts to increase regional integration and trade among the CACs 
themselves and with neighboring Afghanistan, in support of the U.S. aim of stabilizing 
Afghanistan’s economy.231  
D. THE INFLUENCE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION IN CENTRAL ASIA 
In the 1990s, the European Union was busy with different matters such as German 
reunification, the promotion of the Schengen agreement, the wars in Yugoslavia, 
adopting the Central European countries for membership, and generating new ties with 
Moscow; therefore, Central Asia was a second-tier issue on the EU agenda.232 In 1994, 
the first European delegation—known as Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (TACIS)—was opened in Kazakhstan, and partnership and 
cooperation agreements were signed with the CACs in 1996 in order to offer assistance in 
terms of economic and commercial reforms and state building.233	 After 9/11, the EU 
changed its policy toward Central Asia and attributed high importance for the regional 
security of this region. Consequently, in 2006, the EU adopted a new strategy focusing on 
human rights, democratization, good governance, rule of law and eradication of poverty 
in Central Asia.234 By the late 2000s, there had been a gradual increase between the 
relationship of the EU and the CACs.  
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Central Asia is vital for the EU as it tries to maintain its status as an important 
player in the international arena.235 At the same time, the energy resources of Central 
Asia are very important for the EU to break Russia’s stranglehold as the EU’s dominant 
energy supplier. The European Union’s engagement with Central Asia consists of 
different economic dimensions such as bilateral trade, development aid, energy 
relationships and technical assistance. The EU faces different challenges in its 
commitment to the region; its aid programs remain comprehensive and affluent as 
compared to those of other players in Central Asia.236 Correspondingly, the EU made 
significant shift in its policy over Central Asia. In 2007, the EU accepted the “Strategy 
for a New Partnership with Central Asia” to strengthen its cooperation with the CACs. 
EU policy highlights seven priorities for Central Asia, and its main interests are 
sustaining regional stability, countering harmful spillover influence from Afghanistan, 
and securing energy resources (particularly gas from Turkmenistan and oil from 
Kazakhstan).237 EU security interest in Central Asia has been carried out under NATO, 
which is mostly focused on Afghanistan, securing its access of energy and encouraging 
the CACs to make a transition from authoritarian regimes to transparent and open 
governance.238 As a security institution, NATO has difficulties in convincing the 
autocratic regimes of the CACs to loosen their grip on power. Similarly, the EU wants to 
promote democratic values and human rights. Since the EU is following a strategy for 
securing energy resources and building up relationships with the CACs—a late initiative, 
compared to Russia and China—its approach for growing democratic values can often be 
considered a hindrance.  
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E. THE INFLUENCE OF INDIA IN CENTRAL ASIA 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Indian foreign policy had conceptual 
tensions, strategic uncertainty, and geopolitical constraints until the country’s successful 
nuclear tests in May 1998 caused a policy change in its dealings with Central Asia.239 
India is developing its bilateral and multilateral relations with the CACs; its main interest 
in Central Asia is related to Afghanistan, which affects its policy on Pakistan.240 In 2012, 
New Delhi adopted a new ‘Connect Central Asia’ policy to build stronger political ties 
and strengthen strategic and security cooperation with the CACs.241 India plans to engage 
in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and, to a large extent, to found a new 
Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement to develop economic relations with 
the CACs through cross-regional energy infrastructure; new flight connections; and 
development of the IT, banking, and pharmaceutical industries.242 
Central Asia is very import for India’s economy in terms of energy and energy 
security. India imports nearly three quarters of its oil, much of it from the volatile Middle 
East region; therefore, securing its access to energy and diversifying its energy sources 
has become a key element of Indian national security and foreign policy.243 Recently, 
India’s state-owned Oil and Natural Gas Corporation has acquired sizeable stakes in the 
Kazakh Alibekmola and Kurmangazy oilfields of the Caspian Sea.244 On the other hand, 
India has engaged in a prolonged plan regarding the 1680-km-long TAPI pipeline, which 
is intended to carry 30 billion cubic meters of gas from Turkmenistan via Afghanistan 
and Pakistan to India.245 Despite this, India suffers from commercial and geographic 
constraints that prevent it from having significant influence in Central Asia.246 In 2009, 
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India’s trade with all CACs amounted to 2 percent of Russian or Chinese volumes of the 
same year. This shows that India cannot compete with the other major players in terms of 
economic influence in this region.247 
India also attaches high importance to Central Asia in terms of religious 
extremism and terrorist threats. Given the transnational nature of terrorist groups, 
including links with the Taliban and other militant groups in neighboring countries, New 
Delhi is very cautious about the spillover of this danger to its territory, especially in the 
contested state of Kashmir.248 This concern is worsened by the condition in Afghanistan, 
which may spread to and destabilize the fragile CACs and later on counter India’s 
interests. These security fears combine with the proliferation of drug trafficking in 
Central Asia. Weak border management and high levels of corruption, coupled with the 
failure to stop opium manufacture in Afghanistan, have made drug trafficking a 
tremendously profitable business.249 In this context, India tries to increase its influence in 
Central Asia in terms of security. New Delhi has sought to improve its security assets in 
the region, particularly through the acquisition of a foreign military outpost in 
Tajikistan.250 Nevertheless, as the big security player in the region, Russia is unwilling to 
let India establish a permanent military base in Tajikistan.251 In this respect, India’s own 
perception as a regional great power seems to be failing against the challenge of Russia 
and China in Central Asia.252 
F. THE INFLUENCE OF IRAN IN CENTRAL ASIA 
Iran is connected to the CACs by the bonds of geographical closeness, religion 
and, regarding Tajikistan, ethnicity. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Tehran 
followed a policy of three phases. First, Iran read the independence of CACs as an 
opportunity to provide an avenue for dissemination of Islamic principles—Iran’s 
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ideological perception of Islam—in Central Asia under the leadership of Tehran.253 
Tajikistan was the only case where religious actions actually influenced the political 
field. Although Tehran was not involved directly in the upsurge of the Tajik Islamist 
movements, it had closer relations with the leading Islamic Renaissance Party. 
Consequently, neo-communists recaptured Tajikistan and Russia increased its influence 
here in terms of security, which negatively affected the democratic development of this 
country. Iran discovered the obvious dissimilarities in the socio-cultural and religious 
practices of the majority of the Central Asians, as well as political advances—particularly 
the eruption of the Tajik civil war and the rise of the Taliban.254 Iran failed to export its 
administrative model to the CACs because of its ideologically driven foreign policy.255 
At the same time, in the 1990s, Europe and the United States supported Turkey as 
a democratic model country for the CACs instead of Iran, which also reduced the 
influence of Tehran and caused Iran to change its policy over Central Asia.256 Thus, 
Tehran moved to a different phase of its policy, a second stage, with a pragmatic 
assessment of Iran’s interests in Central Asia that obviously went beyond Tajikistan.257 
Iran focused on developing cultural ties with the CACs, such as scholarly exchanges, 
cooperation in education, scholarship offers, and student exchanges.258 In the final stage, 
Tehran concentrated on economic cooperation by building roads, rail, and energy 
pipeline networks. Thus, Iran plans to be a transit state for exports of oil and gas out of 
Central Asia.259 
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Today, Iran is not a politically dominant player, but is an essential economic actor 
in Central Asia.260 Tehran pursues a policy based on the development of bilateral/
multilateral economic and political relations with the CACs under the organizations of 
SCO and the Economic Cooperation Organization.261 
G. THE INFLUENCE OF PAKISTAN IN CENTRAL ASIA 
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Pakistan has attached high importance to 
Central Asia, not only for cultural and religious commonality but also for geo-political 
and geo-economic interests.262 In the early years of the 1990s, Pakistan had good ties 
with the CACs after they gained their independence; internal and external challenges in 
Islamabad, however, prevented progress in this regard. In contrast to the other main 
players in Central Asia—such as China, Russia, India, Turkey, Iran, and the United 
States—Pakistan’s political instability and fragile economy were the main obstacles that 
slowed down the pace of ties between the CACs and Islamabad, and as an external effect 
the unrest in Afghanistan has disturbed bilateral bonds, as well.263 In the framework of 
Pakistan’s bonds with the CACs, Afghanistan’s security is vital since Kabul includes the 
most direct access for the CACs to ports and markets in South Asia and the Persian 
Gulf.264 Afghanistan can also serve as an appropriate field for Central Asian oil and gas 
to South Asia and Iran. Such benefits, for both Pakistan and Central Asia, however, are 
viable only when secure land access is possible through Afghanistan.265 The events of 9/
11 made important shifts both in domestic politics and inter-state relations. Pakistan has 
appeared as a frontline country in the war on terror. Pakistan is trying to cooperate with 
the CACs to sustain the regional stability between South and Central Asia and thus 
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endeavor to save itself from the perception of giving support to extremist groups in 
Afghanistan.266 
Central Asia is very significant for Pakistan in terms of regional security and 
energy access. Pakistan tries to increase its influence in the energy-rich and land-locked 
Central Asia to provide the shortest route for the CACs (via the port of Gwadar) to the 
Arabian Sea and get access to energy in this region.267 Since there is disorder in the 
Pakistani provinces of Baluchistan and FATA along the border with Afghanistan, and no 
shared border with any of the CACs, Pakistan faces difficulties in getting access to oil 
and gas from Central Asia.268 Pakistan and the CACs are members of the Economic 
Cooperation Organization—Turkey and Iran are also members—and Islamabad has 
observer status in the SCO.269 Pakistan and China have common interests regarding 
Central Asia, particularly in trade and energy. Beijing’s backing in creating the multi-
billion-dollar Gwadar port pointed at directing trade between the eastern parts of Central 
Asia and Pakistan through Xinjiang.270 The development of the port and its associated 
international airport, and the formation of a “transport corridor connecting Gwadar to 
China’s easternmost province of Xinjiang, is a game changer for the Central Asian 
region.”271 Additionally, Pakistan wants to meet its electricity needs from the abundant 
Kyrgyz hydroelectric power.272 
Apart from economic interests, the greater driving force behind Pakistan’s efforts 
in Central Asia is the political and strategic benefits. Pakistan views the CACs as 
valuable supporters against India and also as a means of forming brotherhood in terms of 
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a common religion extending from Turkey to Pakistan.273 Thus, Pakistan wants to be an 
important regional player, develop military partners, “create religious allies and most 
importantly, gain leverage vis-à-vis India, especially on the Kashmir issue.”274  
H. CONCLUSION 
Today, there is a stunning new Great Game in Central Asia, a game with many 
players. The main difference between the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ game is the involvement of 
these many players. The older game was ‘great’ because there were two external great 
powers—Britain and Russia—competing for influence in Central Asia. The new game is 
‘great’ since it has active internal, external, and multilateral organizational players with 
constantly changing and interconnected bilateral/multilateral policies, not only in rivalry 
for influence in Central Asia but also power struggles among each other. The Great Game 
of today is mostly related to the discovery of auspicious reserves of oil and natural gas, 
which inspire the interests of external players because they are vital for modern life.275 
The current standing of Central Asia is a very good example of globalization. It is the site 
of a competition for influence by global and regional players, in an energy-rich 
environment, for their own interests. The new great game is still pending and is very 
dynamic, much like the old one. As Lord Curzon described in his memoirs: “in Central 
Asia the position of affairs changes not every hour, but every minute.”276  
Since Central Asia has serious internal problems such as corruption, poverty, etc., 
none of the external players has a genuine interest in physically dominating the area. 
Geopolitical rivalry in Central Asia appears more virtual and symbolic than real.277 
International organizations are more important than individual players to balance the 
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stability in Central Asia. Thus, the CACs have the ability and capacity to play active roles 
to balance the potential external aggressive actors through joining in these institutions. 
Participating of the CACs in the Russian-dominated CSTO, U.S.-dominated NATO’s 
Partnership for Peace Program, or Sino-Russia-dominated SCO is a consideration of 
balancing major players and protecting themselves against the changing strategic 
environment. There is no regional organization consisting of just the CACs to pursue 
their own interests for the long-term stability of Central Asia. Therefore, external 
disputed inputs do not work in favor of the CACs. For example, “the European debt crisis 
limits allocations and means, while U.S.-Russia tensions over missile-defense or over the 
Syrian crisis may contribute to Moscow’s rejection of Western-based projects in Central 
Asia.”278 Thus, the CACs do not fully trust multilateral relations. 
Meanwhile the competition patterns between external actors are 
encouraged by the local governments as they enable them to enforce 
multi-vector strategies by pitting these actors against each other. This 
results in multiple uncoordinated initiatives over which they can exert a 
greater control. The established elites will therefore probably regard 
proposals for joint strategies with suspicion. Moreover, do Europe, Russia 
and China want to cooperate together in the interests of the Central Asians 
or only to avoid patterns of competition arising amongst themselves? 
Concerns over competition largely arise from the energy reserves the 
region has to offer. None of the external actors are eager to take on direct 
security involvement unless its own vital territorial interests are at stake.279    
Apart from its geopolitical importance, Central Asia is reemerging as a vital 
region in terms of energy resources and ground trade routes—today a new Silk Road 
connects East to West. Since every new game player competes for influence in Central 
Asia, taking its own route with bilateral/multilateral relations and under some institutions, 
the region is rife with interconnected and multifaceted struggles. Every player has its own 
cause and reason to be actively involved in Central Asia. Nevertheless, security 
dimension emanating from Afghanistan force all actors to meet at the same basis of 
energy security and regional stability in Central Asia. 
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The new Great Game is reshaping Central Asia, not only in terms of political and 
territorial influence, but also in gaining access to the energy of this region. Given the 
pipeline network, Russia is getting much of the energy from Central Asia and reselling it 
at a good profit to Europe or using it for its own domestic needs. Moscow still enjoys its 
influence over the region and gains political and economic leverage, not only in Central 
Asia but also in Europe.280 In the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the CACs 
tried to reduce Russia’s firm control. Thanks to the efforts of China and some other 
international actors to break the monopoly of Russia in Central Asia by transporting the 
resources outward via different routes, alternative pipeline systems were built, and there 
are some still under construction.281 For example, Kazakhstan is the leading oil producer 
in Central Asia with production of about 1.6 million barrels per day, and 90 percent of 
this amount is exported.282  
As the old colonizer of the CACs, Russia continues to exert its influence in this 
region, politically and economically, while planning to keep its stranglehold on its 
backyard. Russia has a strong relationship with the CACs thanks to some influential 
organization such as the SCO and CSTO, as well as its cultural, ethnic and historical ties 
in Central Asia. Russia is very effective in Central Asia in terms of security with its 
forces and bases in this region. Moscow wields both hard power and soft power to protect 
its economic and security influence in Central Asia, which makes it an important leading 
competitor against China.  
The United States has not only focused on developing bilateral ties with the 
CACs, but also built cooperation with the U.S. and NATO stabilization struggles in 
Afghanistan and their efforts to combat terrorism, proliferation, and trafficking in arms, 
drugs, and persons. U.S. policy has mostly focused on Afghanistan and regional security 
in Central Asia. At the same time, the United States wants the CACs to adopt liberal 
democratic values and free market systems. The EU has, since 2007, substantially 
                                                 





increased its activity and presence in Central Asia in the context of security, access to 
energy resources in the region and development interests. The EU focuses on democratic 
values and human rights, which is seen by Russia and China as interference in the CACs’ 
internal affairs or as tactics to increase their own influence.283 
Iran is a middle-tier power in Central Asia. Tehran tries to economically influence 
this region with its lucrative trade and pipeline routes to the Indian Ocean, which are 
attractive to the CACs. Since Europe and the United States do not approve of Iran’s 
system of government, Tehran’s regime is the main obstacle to increasing its political 
influence in Central Asia.284 Pakistan strives to advance its position in the New Great 
Game to realize its energy and trade needs, while also preserving its political and regional 
importance, particularly against its rival India. India vies for influence in the region in 
terms of energy and security, but Chinese and Russian influence outweighs New Delhi’s 
effect in Central Asia. India attaches high importance to regional stability in terms of the 
spillover of terrorists/radicals from Afghanistan to its territories and losing relative power 
in Central Asia in comparison to Pakistan. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Today there is a dynamic new ‘Great Game’ in Central Asia with the engagement 
of multiple players. The main difference between the ‘old’ and ‘new’ game is the 
interests of the players involved in the game. The original game was ‘great’ because it 
involved only Britain and Russia competing for influence in Central Asia. The new game 
is ‘great’ since it has several active internal, external, and multilateral organizational 
players with ever changing and interconnected bilateral/multilateral policies in rivalry for 
influence in Central Asia. In addition to Central Asia’s geopolitical importance, the 
region’s oil and natural gas reserves are at stake in the current great game. On the other 
hand, their indispensible need for energy makes the new players cooperate in order to 
sustain the security of Central Asia.  
The current standing of Central Asia is a good example of globalization. It is the 
space for the competition among global and regional players to gain influence in energy-
rich Central Asia for their own interests. The new great game is still pending and is just 
as vigorous as the old one. As Lord Curzon described in his memoirs “in Central Asia the 
position of affairs changes not every hour, but every minute.”285  
Central Asia is reemerging as a vital region in terms of energy resources and 
ground trade routes—today a new Silk Road connects East to West. Since every new 
player competes for influence in Central Asia, taking its own route with bilateral/
multilateral relations and under some institutions, there are interconnected and 
multifaceted struggles in Central Asia. The new game is reshaping Central Asia not only 
in terms of political and territorial influence, but also in gaining access to energy of this 
region. Given a vast pipeline network, Russia is getting much of the energy from Central 
Asia and reselling it at a good profit to Europe or using it for its own domestic needs. To 
break down the monopoly of Russia in Central Asia for transporting the resources 
outward with different routes, alternative pipeline systems have been built, and there are 
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some still under construction through the efforts of China and some other international 
actors. Nevertheless, Moscow still enjoys its influence over the region and is gaining 
political and economic leverage not only in Central Asia but also in Europe. Russia has a 
strong relationship with CACs, as the old regional colonizer and thanks to some 
influential organizations, such as SCO, CSTO, and its cultural, ethnic, and historical ties 
in Central Asia. Russia is very effective in Central Asia particularly in terms of security 
with its forces and bases in this region. Moscow has both hard power and soft power 
instruments to protect its economic and security influence in Central Asia, which makes it 
an important leading competitor against China.  
As for other players, the United States has not only focused on developing 
bilateral ties with the CACs but also built cooperation with NATO stabilization scheme 
in Afghanistan and their struggles to combat terrorism, proliferation, and trafficking in 
persons, arms, and drugs. U.S. policy has mostly focused on Afghanistan and regional 
security in Central Asia. At the same time, the United States wants CACs to adopt liberal 
democratic values and free market systems. The EU has significantly increased its 
activity and presence in Central Asia in the context of security, access to energy 
resources in the region, and development interests since 2007. The EU focuses on 
democratic principles and human rights, which is viewed by Russia and China as 
interference in CACs’ internal affairs or as policies to increase their own influence. Iran 
is a middle-tier power in Central Asia. Tehran tries to economically influence this region 
with its trade routes, which attract the CACs for lucrative trading and pipeline options 
available through Iran. Pakistan strives to advance its position as well to satisfy its energy 
and trade needs, while also sustaining its political and regional importance, especially 
against it rival India. Similarly, India is vying for influence in the region in terms of 
energy and security basis; however, Chinese and Russian influences outweigh New 
Delhi’s effect in Central Asia. Yet India attaches high importance to regional stability in 
terms of spill over of terrorists/ radicals from Afghanistan to its territories and fears 
losing relativist power in Central Asia against Pakistan. The different interests of multiple 
players in Central Asia have formed a complicated and malleable environment with 
multiple inputs. Among the all players, China clearly comes to the forefront.  
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China is a dominant player in Central Asia in political, economic, security, and 
energy fields, and China’s overall influence is progressively promoting it as a greater 
power in this region. The economic influence of China’s in Central Asia is dominant in 
each of the five Central Asian countries for which China has become a major economic 
partner through natural resource extraction projects, investments in infrastructure, low 
interest loans, and foreign aid. Central Asia is important to China for a number of critical 
reasons. Today, 85 percent of China’s trade and 80 percent of its energy imports are 
seaborne, which makes China perilously dependent on the safety and security of sea-
lanes. China’s attempts to revive the Silk Road can be viewed in terms of it providing 
China an alternative trade route to reduce its heavy dependency on the sea-lanes. Central 
Asia’s energy resources and alternative trade routes also provide access to the West and 
lead China to engage heavily in the region. Energy and regional security are the heart of 
China’s interests in Central Asia. Beijing controls around 20 percent of Kazakhstan’s oil 
production and imports more than half of its gas from Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. It is 
estimated that if the Chinese expansion into the region continues at the current pace, 
Beijing will be importing half of the region’s gas by 2020. Also, as a rising global player, 
China is showing its power with military exercises under the SCO, and is thereby 
consolidating its economic influence in Central Asia by building stronger economic 
bilateral and multilateral relations with each country in the region.  
At face value, China’s engagement is a win-win situation in which Beijing 
provides necessary capital and the CACs satisfy China’s enormous energy thirst; 
however, if the CACs are not prudent, they could find that they have escaped the grip of 
one great power, Russia, only to replace it with another. Since China is a rising power in 
need of vast energy resources, it narrowly focuses on supplying its energy demand and 
disregards the CACs’ need for development. Currently, Central Asia does not have a 
framework for regional cooperation that can be used to increase these states’ leverage 
when dealing with the rising power. Since the Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan 
economies mostly depend on resource exports, they are overwhelmed by externally 
invested infrastructure, corruption, poverty, and inequality. In addition to having a 
neighbor border with China, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are not hydrocarbon-rich 
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countries. However, they have enough water resources to turn them into economic 
benefits, which may cause a regional water shortage. Furthermore, CACs do not have 
viable tax systems, a situation which has negative effects on governmental representation, 
and thus democratic reforms have been stalled or reversed, except in Kyrgyzstan. 
Currently, economic gains from energy resources play an illusionary role to ensure 
survival of the authoritarian regimes, but they are endangering political security and 
regional stability in the long term. The increasingly disputed distribution of wealth and 
power in Central Asia is prone to trigger social tensions. As a consequence, China is able 
to pressure these governments into accepting its increased involvement in these countries 
on its own terms.  
Since Central Asia has serious internal problems such as corruption, poverty, 
water shortages, etc., none of the external players has a genuine interest in dominating 
Central Asia. Geopolitical rivalry in Central Asia appears more virtual and symbolic than 
real. Currently, international organizations are more important than individual players to 
balance the stability in Central Asia. Thus, CACs have the ability and capacity to play 
some active roles to balance the potential external aggressive actors through joining in 
these institutions. The participation of CACs in the Russian-dominated CSTO, the U.S.-
dominated NATO Partnership for Peace Program, or the Sino-Russia-dominated SCO is a 
consideration for balancing major players and for protecting CACs in the changing 
strategic environment. However, there is no regional organization consisting of only the 
CACs to pursue their own interests in the long-term stability of Central Asia. Therefore, 
externally disputed inputs do not work in favor of CACs. With the help of economic 
relations and cooperation of China, CACs’ foreign currency reserves have increased, 
their finances have become more secure, and there has been a corresponding rise in 
investment and development. Not only has China benefited from such economic 
cooperation, but CACs also view increasing Chinese trade and investments as a catalyst 
for their growth. Additionally, since CACs do not have a sponsor—as the United States is 
for a country like South Korea—and even though they are aware of their heavy reliance 
on China, they try to follow a correct strategy for the benefit of their nations, which is 
relatively more useful than their relations with Russia. What is more, the United States 
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does not focus enough on Central Asia, despite the increasing influence of China, a rising 
global power. Correspondingly, Central Asia remains fragile and requires greater 
attention and a more sustained focus. Unless transparent political reforms are undertaken, 
CACs’ energy reserves may become a ‘resource curse’ and some of these countries risk 
becoming a ‘rentier state’ due to the heavy influence of external powers, particularly 
China. 
To diversify its energy suppliers, and to keep stability and security in its Xinjiang 
region, China’s economic engagement with Central Asia has triggered the ‘New Great 
Game,’ which directly influences the interests of other players. China’s domestic policy 
regarding XUAR informs Beijing’s overall strategy in Central Asia. Prominent 
Kazakhstani sinologist Konstantin Syroyezhkin says that China views Central Asia as a 
strategic rear, since the problems that take place in the region have significant impact on 
China’s Achilles’ heel: Xinjiang.286 As a rising global power, China’s approach towards 
its Muslim minority in the XUAR influences its overall policy towards the Muslim world, 
which is important for China’s acceptance in the international arena as a superpower, and 
in terms of competition with the United States and gaining the sympathy of Muslim 
nations. Therefore, China’s influence in Central Asia is interconnected with its domestic 
policy and foreign policy. Since the XUAR is vulnerable to separatist movements and 
ethnic conflict, XUAR is a key area for Beijing to build and consolidate its foreign policy 
in Central Asia; similarly, Central Asia is a key area for China to enact an attractive 
performance to the overall Muslim world and beyond. Consequently, Beijing’s interests 
in Central Asia are symbolic of and have important implications for its desire to be a 
hegemon in the region in the long run.  
To balance China’s current heavy influence and its potential aggression in the 
long run for the stability of Central Asia, the Turkish Republic holds a critical position. 
Turkey not only has an important role in its strong ties with CACs but also in its ties with 
Uyghur population in terms of ethnicity, language, history, and religion. This means 
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Turkey attributes special significance to preventive diplomacy, generates large mediation 
efforts in a vast geographical area, and endeavors actively for the peaceful resolution of 
conflicts in that region. Apart from historical and cultural links, and taking into account 
the dynamics of existing diplomatic, economic, development, and security cooperation in 
Central Asia, Turkey has significant influence in Central Asia. Also, Turkey has very 
good potential assets to turn into influence in the region. For example, Ankara is a 
dialogue partner of the SCO. Moreover, as a NATO member and an EU candidate 
country, Turkey acts not only as a bridge between the EU and the SCO, but also between 
NATO and the SCO. Turkey is a ‘center’ country between East and West and a secular 
democratic model state for the CACs. Turkey is a model country because of its 
geographic, religious, ethnical, cultural, and historic ties with the CACs. In this context, 
Turkey’s development process fits best for the CACs with a feasible and realistic action 
plan for the long-term stability of Central Asia. 
Turkey should bring together its strong natural ties to the CACs with its potential 
assets under a common desire of CACs, which will make a significant and positive 
change for the long-term stability of Central Asia. Since external large players have 
always influenced CACs according to their own interests and CACs have improved 
themselves considerably until now, to develop Central Asia at regional level with its own 
dynamics, Turkey, as a model country, should guide CACs with a shared action plan of 
development under the joint effort of CACs. Turkey wants to promote cooperation with 
the CACs for the long-term stability of Central Asia. Turkey feels a responsibility for the 
CACs since it has very strong ties as part of a brotherhood. Turkey usually sees these 
countries as brother states. According to Turkish culture, brothers do their best for each 
other and sacrifice their own interest on behalf of their brothers. Since there are potential 
aggressors, Turkey is required to help and promote CACs. Turkey aims to build strong 
relations with CACs with no selfish motives. Turkey’s foreign aid and its willingness to 
embrace Iraq’s immigrants during the Gulf War and some two million Syrian immigrants 
in 2014 shows that Turkey follows a very humanitarian foreign policy in terms of 
collaboration and cooperation. In this respect, Turkey proves itself to undertake extra 
economical cost even disregarding realistic and pragmatist interests. In this context, most 
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of the countries admire Turkey’s complimentary generous aid and assistance to 
foreigners who are in need of help. In 2013, Turkey ranked first with $1.6 billion in the 
list of donations when compared to gross national income. Thus, Turkey verifies its well-
intentioned and friendly approach throughout the world as well as in Central Asia. This 
policy does not include any aggressive agenda like that of other external players. 
Therefore, for the CACs, Turkey is the best model and counterpart with which to 
cooperate. As can be understood from the Turkish foreign policy of ‘peace at home and 
abroad,’ Turkey wants to contribute to the development of Central Asia without causing 
harm to any country.  
Today, since Turkey gives special importance to the Central Asia region for being 
the land of its ancestors, and thanks to Ankara’s robust ties with the CACs, in terms of 
history, ethnicity, language, religion, and culture, Turkey can play an important role for 
the overall development of Central Asia with the cooperation of CACs. First, as a good 
example of secular democratic regime, Turkey can prove the benefits of democracy with 
its institutions just representing its model to CACs—without forcing them but letting 
them see the potential in adopting the institutions of democracy. Thus, Turkey will bridge 
the West and CACs in terms of increasing the wealth of these countries. The positives of 
the West can be transferred from Turkey to these countries. Second, Turkey can be a 
mediator to solve the current disputes in the Central Asia, such as the matter of the 
Fergana Valley among Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, the potential water 
problem in the Central Asia, or as a balance in the cooperation of CACs against the 
potential aggressive influence of China and Russia or other actors. Third, Turkey can be 
an economic model to CACs; thus, these states can develop on their own with 
cooperation but a sponsor. Fourth, parallel to the CACs’ democratization process, Turkey 
can help CAC states to build their new modern armies with the cooperation of the West. 
Finally, Turkey can be an educative model to CACs, which is vital to bringing up the 
next generation of these countries. 
Overall, China’s authoritarian regime, domestic problems, and huge energy 
demands hold potential threats for the long-term stability of Central Asia, particularly in 
terms of the Diversification Theory of War. To sustain the survival of the regime, Central 
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Asia is open to the risk of aggression from China, which may seek to divert public 
attention from its internal matters such as corruption, separatist movements, pollution, 
and particularly the Uyghur question. Since the CACs are not strong enough to withstand 
the possibility of Chinese aggression alone, they are more likely to cooperate or accept 
Chinese-run policies in Central Asia in order to achieve a win-win policy. Ultimately, 
though, this will gradually violate the legitimacy of the CACs in terms of adopting 
Chinese policies in regard to the Uygur population and Beijing’s unending demand for 
energy. China’s win-win policy will likely turn out to be a win-lose game, in which 
China becomes the sole hegemon in control of all Central Asia. Therefore, CACs should 
act as a union and implement strong reforms to balance Chinese influence by cooperating 
with West.  
Turkey can balance China’s current heavy influence and potential long-term 
aggression in Central Asia with the joint will and cooperation of the CACs, drawing on 
their strong ties. CACs’ standpoint is the key point for realizing Turkey’s balancing role 
against China. The China-led SCO is deeply influential in Central Asia in terms of 
security and economy. To mitigate China’s influence in Central Asia, as a model country, 
Turkey should encourage the CACs to build a regional economic and security 
organization, which should include only them and run under CACs’ leadership to 
collaborate for the growth of Central Asia and work for their own interest. Joint 
cooperation would help address pressing issues like water shortages, assist with the 
region’s development, and overall, foster long-term stability. Using its stronger ties under 
Social Constructivism, Turkey can play a mediator and unifier role to build self-
confidence at the national and regional level, without asking for help from a sponsor, 
China, to survive. Since Turkey is a member state of NATO, a security organization 
including Turkey and the CACs will also shield and secure the CACs. At the same time, 
it will neutralize China’s potential aggression in the long run. Similarly, Turkey’s joining 
the SCO will contribute much to protect the CACs’ rights and disrupt China’s one-sided 
policy. Therefore, CACs should support Turkey’s joining the SCO. In this respect, more 
interaction with Turkey will enable the CACs to perceive the benefits of democracy, and 
this will encourage them to move in the direction of democracy. In this respect, 
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Kyrgyzstan’s experience with democratization can also be a catalyst and provide a 
contagious effect for the all CACs, which will gain the support of West.  
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